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ARKANSAS' MISSED OPPORTUNITY FOR REHABILITATION:
SENDING CHILDREN TO ADULT COURTS
Gerard F. Glynn*
I. INTRODUCTION
While approximately 13,291 delinquent acts are committed by children'
in Arkansas each year,' the public policy debate over how best to address
delinquency is often fueled by the horrendous acts of a few children.' One of
* Director of Legal Clinic and Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at
Little Rock School of Law. I thank my research assistants Shannon Wilson and Ann Carr who
helped make this article possible. I also thank my many friends and colleagues who provided
guidance, including Toni Clarke, Justine Dunlap, Donna Gay, Connie Hickman Tanner, J. Leon
Johnson, and Spencer Robinson. I also thank my partner in many things more important than
this article, Angela Halladay, for her feedback, editing and patience.
Following the writing of this article but shortly before it was printed, the Arkansas
Supreme Court issued an opinion that reverses prior precedent and adopts the position
expressed in this article that the information alone is not sufficient to justify keeping a child in
adult court. See Thompson v. State, No. 97-339 (Dec. 11, 1997). I commend the Court for this
move. However, there are many other issues raised in this article that need to be addressed by
the courts, legislators, and practitioners.
1. This article will refer to persons under the age of 18 as children. Under the law,
persons under the age of 18 are not allowed to vote, see U. S. CONST., amend. XXVI, § I;
cannot contract, I DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN §§ 10.01-10.06 (2d ed.
1994); must submit to the reasonable commands of their parents, see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §
9-27-303(16)(B) (Michie Supp. 1995), see also 2 KRAMER, supra § 20.03; must attend school,
see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-201 (Michie Supp. 1995); see also 2 KRAMER, supra § 24.04;
cannot marry, see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-102 (Michie 1993), see also KRAMER, supra
§ 14.04; do not have the Constitutional protections of liberty, see Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); and do not have the same protections of privacy as adults. See id.
Society deprives those under eighteen years of age of many rights and provides them with extra
protection based on a belief that their poor judgment may leave them to make mistakes and also
leave them vulnerable to exploitation by others. See KRAMER, supra § 14.03. Thus, they are
children.
Under the Arkansas Juvenile Code, persons under the age of 18 are referred to as
juveniles. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-303(1)(A) (Michie 1995). This term is used whether
the children are victims of abuse and neglect or charged with a delinquent act. The connotation
of the term "juvenile" is negative because "juvenile" is often associated with "juvenile
delinquent." This negative connotation is made stronger by the political rhetoric surrounding
legislative proposals such as the "Violent Youth Predator Act of 1996" United States House
Res. 3565.
I choose to describe all persons under the age of 18 as children. They may be children
who have committed horrendous acts. They may also be children needing removal from society
for a very long time, but they are still children.
2. According to the Arkansas Administrative Office of the Courts data, there were
13,291 petitions for delinquency or petitions for revocation of delinquency probation filed in
Arkansas juvenile courts in 1995.
3. See, e.g., Jim Brooks & Jim Kordsmeier, 'I've Been Shot, 'Caller Told Police 4 Boys.
Age 12-15, Held In Woman's Slaying, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, July 31, 1994, at IA
(twelve-year-old, fourteen-year-old, and two fifteen-year-olds charged with a murder committed
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the responses to these horrendous acts is to remove certain children from the
juvenile court process into the adult criminal process.4 This process of removal
of children to adult court is sometimes called "juvenile transfer," "waiver,"
"declination of jurisdiction," or "certification. '5
Arkansas has followed the national trend in sending more and more
children to adult courts. While a few children may need to be sent to adult
courts and prison, the widespread removal of children to adult courts is a
mistake. The juvenile justice system provides the best chance of rehabilitating
children. If we send children to adult courts and eventually to adult prisons,
they will return to society without the benefit of the rehabilitative programs
offered by the juvenile justice system.
This article critiques the justifications for removing children to adult
courts, details the impact of this process around the nation, and analyzes the
status of Arkansas' system. The article will also provide suggestions for
improving the Arkansas system by proposing that we take advantage of the
good models around the country while rejecting the faulty models.
during a robbery); Cynthia Howell & Jim Kordsmeier, Student, 20, Shot Dead on School Bus,
ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, Oct. 10, 1996, at IA (fourteen-year-old charged with the shooting
death of classmate); Jim Kordsmeier, 12-Year-Old Arrested. Jailed in NLR Killing Police
Expect to Make Further Arrests Soon, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE. July 30, 1994, at I A; Joe
Stumpe, Prosecutor: No Kid Gloves When Killer 13, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, Feb. 18, 1996,
at I A (thirteen-year-old killed his father's fiancee and raped her seven-year-old daughter).
While these incidents fuel the debate, most children, even most delinquent children, do
not commit violent crimes and most children transferred to adult court are not repeat violent
offenders. See generally Robert 0. Dawson, An Empirical Study of Kent Style Juvenile
Transfers to Criminal Court, 23 ST. MARY'S L. J. 975 (1992); Laurren Q. D'Ambra, A Legal
Response to Juvenile Crime: Waiver and Certification Statute in Rhode Island, R. I. B. J.,
February 1997, at 5.
There are also horrendous stories of the abuse of children incarcerated in adult jails or
prisons. See, e.g., Daphne Davis, Teen Tells ofAbuse by Cellmates 3 Charged After Washington
County Jailers Hear of Rape. Torture, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, May 23, 1996, at I B
(fifteen-year-old is tortured for almost a week at the hands of fellow inmates); Teen Says 3
Raped Him in Jail April 3, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, April 17, 1997, at 3B (seventeen-year-
old boy says he was raped by three other boys while being held in the Mississippi County jail);
Linda Satter, 5th Man Sentencedfor Rape, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, Oct. 11, 1994, at 2B
(five men are convicted of gang-raping a seventeen-year-old in the Pulaski County Jail).
4. See generally Donna M. Bishop et al., The Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court:
Does It Make a Difference?, 42 CRIME & DELINQUENCY, 171 (1996); Catherine R. Guttman,
Note, Listen to the Children: The Decisions to Transfer Juveniles to Adult Court, 30 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 507, 507-09 (1995).
5. See 2 KRAMER, supra note I, § 22.16. Throughout this article the terms "waiver,"
"transfer," and "removal" will be used interchangeably. The use of these terms can be
confusing in Arkansas because children are not transferred to adult court. In Arkansas, children
are often charged in adult court and the transfer decision involves a decision whether to transfer
children to juvenile court. Arkansas is in the minority of states that start this process in adult
court. See infra part IlI.B.2.
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In the first section, the article discusses the history of juvenile court. In
the second section, the article details the social and political debate around the
removal of children to adult courts and the structural options adopted by many
states. In the third section, the article explains the impact transferring of
children has on the state systems around the nation. In the fourth section, the
law in Arkansas is critiqued historically and under the modem juvenile code
and court jurisprudence. Finally, the article recommends changes for Arkansas
that will address some of the socio-political concerns while meeting the goals
of rehabilitation.
I. HISTORY OF JUVENILE COURTS THROUGHOUT THE NATION
Prior to the creation of juvenile courts, children were treated as any other
persons by the criminal courts;6 however, the courts recognized, and presum-
ably still do, the defense of infancy which negated culpability for a crime.7 The
law provided an irrebuttable presumption that children under the age of seven
could not commit a crime, a rebuttable presumption that children between the
ages of seven and fourteen could not commit a crime, and a rebuttable
presumption that children fourteen through seventeen were able to commit
crimes.8 This defense was based on a belief that a certain aged child was too
immature to understand the likely consequences of his or her act and thus did
not have the mens rea required for a criminal conviction. 9
Although there was a defense of infancy, children were still prosecuted as
adults and sent to prison in this nation throughout the 1800's. The brutality of
incarcerating children alongside hardened adult criminals led to reform efforts
in the late 1800's.Io In response to these efforts, the first juvenile court in the
nation was established in Illinois in 1899." The goals of these early courts
were described by the United States Supreme Court in In re Gault:
The early reformers were appalled by adult procedures and penalties, and
by the fact that children could be given long prison sentences and mixed
in jails with hardened criminals. They were profoundly convinced that
society's duty to the child could not be confined by the concept ofjustice
alone. They believed that society's role was not to ascertain whether the
6. S6ee 2 KRAMER, supra note 1, § 21.01; Paula J. Casey, Arkansas Juvenile Courts: Do
Lay Judges Satisfy Due Process In Delinquency Cases?, 6 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 501
(1983).
7. See 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 175(b) (1984).
8. See 2 KRAMER, supra note 1, § 21.01, at n.l. See also, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16
(1967); Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859, 878-79, 554 S.W.2d 312, 321 (1977).
9. See 2 ROBINSON, supra note 7, § 175(a).
10. See 2 KRAMER, supra note 1, § 21.01.
11. See 2 KRAMER, supra note 1, § 21.01.
1997]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
child was "guilty" or "innocent," but "What is he, how has he become what
he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the
state to save him from a downward career." The child -- essentially good,
as they saw it -- was to be made "to feel that he is the object of (the state's)
care and solicitude," not that he was under arrest or on trial.... The idea
of crime and punishment was to be abandoned. The child, was to be
"treated" and "rehabilitated" and the procedures, from apprehension
through institutionalization, were to be "clinical" rather than punitive.12
Other states followed the Illinois model and established juvenile courts
aimed at protecting and rehabilitating children. 13 These new juvenile courts did
not provide children the same procedural protections afforded adults charged
with crimes. 4 These procedural protections were not seen as necessary
because the goals of these courts were to protect and rehabilitate children, not
punish them.'5 Therefore, juvenile courts were closed to the public, and the
records were sealed to protect children from the stigma of criminal convictions.
Juvenile proceedings were not seen as adversarial, thus eliminating the need for
the rights to counsel or cross-examination.
In the 1960's, this process of handling children was challenged as a
violation of the federal constitutional protection of due process. In a series of
cases, the Supreme Court concluded that due process mandates that children
be provided many of the procedural protections afforded an adult charged with
a crime.1 6 These holdings led to dramatic changes in the handling of children
charged with delinquent acts. 7 Now, many of the procedural protections
afforded an adult accused of a crime are provided to children charged with
delinquent acts. 8 All fifty states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth
12. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16.
13. See 2 KRAMER, supra note 1, § 21.01. See also ARKANSAS COMM'N ON JUV. JUST.,
JUVENILE COURTS IN ARKANSAS, at 3 (1989).
14. See 2 KRAMER, supra note 1, § 21.01.
15. These assertions were questioned and in many respects rejected by the United States
Supreme Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 12-31.
16. See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1967); Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
These holdings do not convert a juvenile delinquency proceeding into a criminal
proceeding. These proceedings continue to be essentially civil procedures with heightened
levels of constitutionally mandated due process. See 2 KRAMER, supra note 1, § 21.06.
17. These new juvenile courts used terminology different from adult courts. Children
were charged with "delinquent acts" not crimes, were "adjudicated" not convicted, and were
given "dispositions" not sentences. See 2 KRAMER, supra note 1, § 21.01. See also, Arkansas
Juvenile Code, ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-301, et seq.
18. Children have rights to notice of the delinquency charges, see In re Gault, 387 U.S.
at 33-44; counsel, see id., confrontation, see id. at 41, cross-examination, see id. at 56-57,
privilege against self-incrimination, see id. at 55, determination of guilt beyond reasonable
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of Puerto Rico, and the federal government have juvenile court systems which
attempt to balance the need for rehabilitation with the rights of the children and
their families.' 9
Although the nation has not rejected rehabilitation as the main goal of the
juvenile justice system, many states have moved to eliminate many of the
protections previously afforded children. More states have opened these
proceedings to the public, removed the protection provided by the
expungement of records, and have moved to try more children as adults.
III. THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT TO REMOVE KIDS TO ADULT COURTS
All state juvenile codes and the federal Juvenile Justice Act provide for a
procedure to remove some children from juvenile court jurisdiction to adult
court jurisdiction. These procedures can be accomplished through legislative
action,2" proscutorial action," or judicial action.22 The differences in the states
depend on policy choices made regarding the treatment of children.
A. The Political Debate Around the Country
Historically, there has always been debate about whether certain children
are beyond rehabilitation and thus should be sent to adult prisons for their
crimes. This is still the core of the debate on the juvenile transfer process. The
movement to remove children accused of crimes to adult courts started in the
1970's, and has intensified to the present day.23 The primary justification for
this movement has been a need for harsh punishment that will lead to
deterrence.24
doubt, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 369; and protection from double jeopardy, see Breed, 421
U.S. at 541.
19. See 2 KRAMER, supra note 1, § 21.01. The histories of many of these systems
including Arkansas' system, are very similar. See infra part V. A.
20. See infra part III.B.I.
21. See infra part III.B.3.
22. See infra part III.B.2.
23. Some have suggested that the move to transfer is related to the increased due process
procedures mandated for juvenile courts by the U. S. Supreme Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1 (1967) and its progeny. See generally Bishop et al., supra note 4, at 171-73. Whereas there
may be a correlation, there is no evidence of a causation. The better explanation for the
popularity of the removal of children to adult courts is the rise in the crime rates in the 1970s
and 1980s.
24. There are two types of deterrence: specific and general. Specific deterrence is an effort
to prevent a specific individual from repeating an act. General deterrence is an effort to send
a message to the general population to prevent anyone else from thinking about committing an
act that would lead to harsh punishment.
Another justification for the removal of children to the adult corrections system is
1997]
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1. Punishment & General Deterrence
Our nation has not rejected the belief that children who commit crimes can
be rehabilitated.2 However, proponents of the removal of children to the adult
criminal system argue that children are manipulating the juvenile justice system
and the system doesn't deter other children from committing criminal acts.
Proponents believe that the threat of the harsher punishment in the adult system
will deter others from committing criminal acts.
Although some political rhetoric assumes that children will be treated
more harshly in adult court,26 studies on the subject do not always support this
conclusion.27 Children transferred to adult court often receive probation, fines
or other nonconfinement sentences many times with little or no rehabilitative
programs.28 If sentenced to incarceration in the adult system, children are often
given shorter sentences than similar offenders confined in juvenile training
schools.29 Many have concluded that children are treated more leniently by the
criminal courts because they are appearing there for the first time, and juries
tend to be more sympathetic to children facing prison."
incapacitation. Most children sent to the adult corrections system, however, will receive shorter
sentences. See Dale Parent et al., Transferring Serious Juvenile Offenders to Adult Courts,
NAT'L INST. OF JUST. RES. IN ACTION, at 2 (Jan. 1997).
25. See 2 KRAMER, supra note 1, § 21.01. See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-302(3)
(Michie Repl. 1995) (One of the purposes of the Juvenile Code is "[tio protect society more
effectively by substituting for retributive punishment, whenever possible, methods of offender
rehabilitation and rehabilitative restitution .... "); Guttman, supra note 4.
26. See Bishop et al., supra note 4, at 172-74.
27. See Dawson, supra note 3, at 1030-43. In this study about the Texas process of
transferring children to court, only 58% of the children transferred to adult court received a
prison sentence. See Dawson, supra note 3, at 1031. See also 2 KRAMER, supra note 1, §
22.16; Guttman, supra note 4.
Ironically, the likelihood of lighter treatment may have been the motivating factor behind
the creation of the juvenile justice system in Arkansas. When reviewing the 1907 creation of
the juvenile system in Arkansas, Paula Casey wrote:
Removing children from adult prisons was a step forward although some
convicted juveniles might have disagreed since the alternatives for the juvenile
under the old system were not necessarily prison or reform school but rather
prison or freedom. Many courts were understandably reluctant to sentence
convicted juveniles to state prisons. Even when a juvenile was sentenced to
prison there was an extremely good possibility of a governor's pardon, at least
during the terms of one governor. Perhaps the real motivation for the reform
school legislation was not so much the rehabilitation and reform of juveniles
as it was to get the convicted juveniles off the streets and confine them.
Casey, supra note 6, at 502-04.
28. See Parent, supra note 24, at 2. But see Bishop, et al., supra note 4, at 174-176 (article
discussing the mixed results of studies on this subject).
29. See Parent, supra note 24, at 2. See also 2 KRAMER, supra note i, § 22.16.
30. See Parent, supra note 24, at 2. See also, 2 KRAMER, supra note I, § 22.16; Guttman,
supra note 4.
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Even if one accepts the argument that adult sentences will lead to general
deterrence, with the exception of few offenses, these children will someday be
released from prison. The question for society is whether they want them
released with the benefits of the rehabilitation offered in the juvenile system or
released from the harshness of the adult system.
2. Specific Deterrence
Proponents of prosecuting children in adult court argue that children are
more sophisticated today than in the past and take advantage of the leniency of
the juvenile system .3 These proponents believe that transferring children to
adult court will enhance specific deterrence. There is a sense that some
children need to be removed because rehabilitation, if it works at all, would not
work for children charged with violent offenses. 32  However, sociological
evidence tends to negate this proposition.33 One study found:
Overall, the results suggest that transfer in Florida has had little deterrent
value. Nor has it produced any incapacitative benefits that enhance public
safety. Although transferred youths were more likely to be incarcerated
and to be incarcerated for longer periods than those retained in the juvenile
justice system, they quickly reoffended at a higher rate than the
nontransferred controls, thereby negating any incapacitative benefits that
might have been achieved in the short run.3
If one associates rehabilitation with a reduced likelihood of rearrest, the
juvenile system seems to be succeeding. 35 This study in Florida compared
similarly situated children who had been transferred to adult court with children
who remained in the juvenile system.36 The results indicated that children
transferred to adult court are more likely to be rearrested, arrested more
quickly, and arrested for more severe offenses than are the children who
remained in the juvenile system.37 This movement to remove children is an
abandonment of hope for children caught in the justice system.38  These
31. See Bishop, supra note 4, at 173-174.
32. This stigma of outcasts may lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy. If these children are
told, by the decision to transfer them to adult court, that society no longer believes they can be
rehabilitated, they may reoffend because they have internalized the lack of hope. See Bishop,
et al., supra note 4, at 184.
33. See Bishop, supra note 4, at 183-85.
34. Bishop, supra note 4, at 183.
35. See Bishop, supra note 4, at 171. Other studies have also found that children are
responsive to rehabilitative treatment. See, e.g., Guttman, supra note 4, at 510.
36. See Bishop, supra note 4, at 175-77.
37. See Bishop, supra note 4, at 181-85.
38. See D'Ambra, supra note 3, at 5.
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children need the benefits of good rehabilitation programs which can work with
most children.39
Furthermore, the categorization of children as a procedure for the removal
of groups of children is not consistent with the psychological evidence
regarding childhood development. Children develop at different speeds. Some
children are more mature at age sixteen than others, and some may never
mature. This was the justification for the traditional transfer proceedings which
include a review of the maturity of the child.40 The wholesale transfer of
categories of children, either by lowering the age of juvenile court jurisdiction
or by excluding certain crimes from juvenile court, ignores the impact of
individual development.4'
B. Structural Options Chosen For Processing Children To Adult Courts
When developing a process for choosing which children to send to the
adult court process, states have three alternative decision-makers: legislators,
judges, and prosecutors. The choice among these decision-makers raises issues
of the balance of power between the branches of government, the community's
political confidence in each branch, and issues of competence.42
39. See D'Ambra, supra note 3, at 5; Guttman, supra note 3, at 510.
40. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-34 (Supp. 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(e)(2)-(3)
(Michie Supp. 1995); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (West Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 19-3-108 (2)(b)(IV) (West Repl. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 101 0(c)(l)(a) (Supp.
1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.059(7)(c)(4) (West Supp. 1997) (maturity is one of the factors
a court considers in deciding whether to impose criminal or juvenile sanctions). TEX. FAM.
CODE. ANN. § 54.02(0 (West 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-603(e) (Supp. 1997); VT. CODE
ANN. tit. 33, § 5506(d)(1) (1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1(g-j) (Repl. Michie 1996);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-157(5)(f) (Supp. 1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 21 1.071(b)(6) (West
1996). One of the problems is that this evidence is rarely presented in a scientific way. See
infra part V.A.2.b.iii.
41. An overwhelming majority of these children also come from dysfunctional
environments. See Guttman, supra note 4, at 516-18. They may be from stressed families or
neighborhoods where crime is an accepted way of life. See OFFICE OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ.
PREVENTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DELINQUENCY PREVENTION WORKS (1995). A
mistake that is often made with these children is an assumption that they will recognize the
benefit of and avail themselves of the services available in the juvenile justice system. See, e.g.,
Holmes v. State, 322 Ark. 574, 579, 911 S.W.2d 256, 259 (1995). It may not be reasonable to
expect any adolescent, even one with a strong support system, to avail himself of services, and
it is certainly not reasonable to expect a child from a dysfunctional system to avail himself of
services. This does not mean that a child should not be held responsible for a failure to meet
clearly defined expectations, but often children are expected to understand their specific need
for services and to find services for themselves, which is not a reasonable expectation.
42. See Guttman, supra note 4. This article suggests that judicial waiver is like a safety
valve which finds those children "who pose too great a threat to public safety to evade long-
term confinement." Whereas, prosecutorial and legislative waiver "act less like a safety valve
and more like a vacuum, sucking children into the adult system." See Guttman, supra note 4
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1. Legislators Decide
Legislators always make the first decision about children's removal to
adult court. Children do not have a constitutional right to proceed in juvenile
court.43 Therefore, legislators can decide at what age juvenile court jurisdiction
ends. Traditionally, juvenile court jurisdiction ends between the ages of
seventeen and nineteen." If the delinquent act occurs before a child's birthdate
that would trigger adult court jurisdiction, juvenile codes generally permit
juvenile court to retain jurisdiction throughout the child's treatment until the
age of twenty-one.4"
Legislators have recently pushed for a greater number of young children
to be processed in adult court.' This can be mandated by lowering the
jurisdictional age limit ofjuvenile court,47 by mandating that certain crimes be
at 509-10.
43. See 2 KRAMER, supra note , § 21.01.
44. See 2 KRAMER, Supra note 1, § 21.02.
45. See 2 KRAMER, supra note I, § 21.02. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-32 (Supp. 1996);
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 607 (West Supp. 1997) (court retains jurisdiction until the age of
twenty-one for a person committed to the Department of the Youth Authority); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 39.022(4)(b) (West. Supp. 1997) (court retains jurisdiction until the age of 21 for a habitual
offender or a child eligible for intensive residential treatment); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-
104(!)(a) (Repl. 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5504(6) (1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-242
(Repl. Michie 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.041 (West 1996).
46. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE
CRIME, 3-9 (1996).
47. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-120 (West 1995) (juvenile court applies to
persons under the age of sixteen).
This lowering of the age limit appears to be a rejection of the idea that rehabilitation can
work with most adolescents, but the retention of some juvenile court jurisdiction appears to be
an acceptance that the rehabilitative model can work with younger children. See 2 KRAMER,
supra note 1, § 22.17.
1997]
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waived to adult court,4 or by expanding the pool of lower-aged children
subject to judicial or prosecutorial waiver into adult court.49
2. Judges Decide
There are several methods by which states permit or require judicial
review of a request to charge children as adults. Some states mandate ajudicial
hearing when any child under eighteen is threatened with removal from
juvenile court jurisdiction.5° Other states mandate hearings only upon a motion
by a party or the court.5' Jurisdictions vary as to whether the hearing is held in
juvenile court, in adult court,53 or in either court. 4 Considering that the
48. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-34 (Supp. 1996) (certain offenses committed by a sixteen or
seventeen-year-old lead to adult prosecution with no chance of juvenile court jurisdiction.);
ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.030(a) (Michie 1996) (certain felonies committed by a sixteen or
seventeen-year-old lead to adult prosecutions with a chance for delinquency disposition if
convicted of a lesser offense); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-127 (West 1995) (children
fourteen or older shall be transferred to adult court for capital and serious felony offenses); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1010(a)(1) (Supp. 1996) (murder, unlawful sexual intercourse or
kidnaping are tried as adult prosecutions); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-601 (Repi. 1996) (murder
or serious youth offenders are tried as adults); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5502(a)( 1 )(A) (1991)
(children over the age of sixteen charged with enumerated offenses are tried as adults); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 260.015(5)(b) (West Supp. 1997) (a sixteen or seventeen year old child charged
with murder is tried as an adult); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-15 1(a)(l-2) (Supp. 1997) (offenses
punishable by life imprisonment or death or offenses committed with a deadly weapon are tried
in adult court).
49. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 707 (West Supp. 1997) (lowered from sixteen
to fourteen); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1010(c)(1) (Supp. 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.071
(West 1996) (twelve year olds can be transferred to adult court).
50. Arkansas law used to require such a hearing for any fourteen or fifteen year old
charged with an offense in adult court. See 1989 Ark. Acts 273, § 17(b)(2). However, this
procedure was repealed in 1994. See 1994 Ark. Acts 40.
51. See e.g. ALA. CODE § 12-15-34(a) (Supp. 1996) (prosecutor may request a transfer
hearing); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(d) (Michie Supp. 1995) (any party or the court can move
for a hearing); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1010 & 1011 (Supp. 1996) (either party or the court
may move for consideration of a transfer); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02 (West 1996); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5506(b) (1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.125 (West Supp. 1997); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 43-21-157 (Supp. 1997).
52. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-34 (Supp. 1996); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (West
Supp. 1997); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02 (West 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-603
(Supp. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1 (Repl. Michie 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.125
(West Supp. 1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.071 (West 1996).
53. There are no juvenile courts in the federal judiciary. All the proceedings occur in
federal district courts if the state court does not have or refuses to exercise jurisdiction. See 18
U.S.C. § 5032 (1994).
54. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(d) (Michie Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
10, §§ 1010-1011 (Supp. 1996).
Although Arkansas applies this method, most hearings occur in circuit court because the
prosecutor has the initial discretion to file the charges in either court, and it is usually the
defense moving to have the case removed to juvenile court. However, there have been cases
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decision is essentially which of the children who commit offenses should be
sent to adult court, the logical decision maker is the juvenile judge." He or she
has more experience with the population of children accused of crimes with
which to make a valid comparison and would presumably be in the best
position to weigh all of the factors set fourth in the transfer statute. 6
In those cases in which a judge participates in the decision whether to try
a child as an adult, he or she normally applies a version of the standards
suggested by the U.S. Supreme Court in Kent v. United States. 7 These Kent
standards have been incorporated into .the laws of almost all U.S.
in which ajuvenile court has initiated proceedings to remove a child to adult court. See, e.g.,
Collins v. State, 322 Ark. 161, 908 S.W.2d 80 (1995); Smith v. State, 307 Ark. 223, 818
S.W.2d 945 (1991). Unless a statute of limitations is about run, it is easier for a prosecutor to
enter a nolle prosequi in juvenile court and refile the charges in circuit court, than to initiate a
transfer from juvenile court to circuit court.
55. See KRAMER, supra note I, § 21.01; see, e.g., Allison Boyce, Note, Choosing the
Forum: Prosecutorial Discretion and Walker v. State, 46 ARK. L. REV. 985, 1002-03, 1008-09
(1994); Dawson, supra note 3, at 1052. The majority of states follow this procedure that begins
in juvenile court. See, supra note 52; See also, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46(b)-127 (West
1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-157 (Supp. 1997).
56. See Boyce, supra note 55, at 1008-09. In some rural jurisdictions, this distinction
between a juvenile judge and adult court judge becomes meaningless because one judge will
hear all cases, criminal or juvenile.
57. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). Although the Court in Kent did not mandate any specific criteria
be followed when considering a decision to send a child to adult court, the Court appeared to
approve the criteria used by the District of Columbia juvenile judge. These criteria were
attached as an appendix to the Supreme Court decision. The criteria were:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the protection
of the community requires waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or
willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater weight
being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is evidence upon which a
Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment (to be determined by consultation with the
United States Attorney).
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when the
juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged with a crime in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of his
home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous contacts with the
Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts and other jurisdictions,
prior periods of probation to this Court, or prior commitments to juvenile institutions.
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable
rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have committed the alleged offense) by the use
of procedures, services and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court.
Id. at 566-567.
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jurisdictions." These standards basically mandate a review of the seriousness
of the offense, the child's background, and the juvenile system's resources.59
3. Prosecutors Decide
There are several ways prosecutors can be given discretion to decide
which children should be tried in adult court. First, prosecutors can be given
complete discretion to decide without judicial review. Second, prosecutors can
directly file the case in adult court and be reviewed only upon a motion.6"
Third, prosecutors can be required to ask a judge's permission to file in adult
court.6
It is assumed that prosecutors choose the most serious offenses to transfer
to adult court. There are studies that both affirm and challenge this
conclusion.62 A Texas study affirmed this belief and concluded that if the
transfer statute requires judicial review, prosecutors often consider the Kent
judicial standards in making their decisions.63 However, a Florida study found
that prosecutors used their discretion to charge many nonviolent first time
offenders in adult court for minor offenses.'
If there is not meaningful judicial review, one of the concerns regarding
prosecutorial waiver is a lack of scrutiny." If a prosecutor wants a child in
adult court and is required to meet statutory qualifying offenses, he or she may
overcharge to get a child into adult court." A basic tenet of our criminal justice
58. See Dawson, supra note 3, at 981.
59. See Dawson, supra note 3, at 981; see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(e) (Michie
Supp. 1995).
60. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318 (Michie Supp. 1995).
61. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-34(a) (Supp. 1996); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707
(West Supp. 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-127(6) (West 1995) (for lower level
felonies); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1 (Repl. Michie 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.125
(West Supp. 1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.071 (West 1997).
62.. See Dawson, supra note 3, at 985-1009; cf. Boyce, supra note 55, at 999-1000 n.91
(evaluating a study conducted by the Center for Studies in Criminology and Law at the
University of Florida).
63. See Dawson, supra note 3, at 983, 1051-52. This study of transfer decisions in Texas
concluded that prosecutors' application of the criteria to be applied by the judge made "further
winnowing of cases using the same criteria difficult." Dawson, supra note 3, at 1051.
However, in Arkansas, where judges often defer to the prosecutors' waiver decisions,
prosecutors may be less likely to meaningfully apply any criteria. See infra part V.B.
64. See Boyce, supra note 55, at 999-1000.
65. See Stacy Sabo, Note, Rights of Passage: An Analysis of Waiver of Juvenile Court
Jurisdiction, 64 FORDI-AM L. REV. 2425, 2426-27 (1996) "[T]he prosecutor makes the
'critically important' waiver decision outside of the adversarial process, in the privacy of her
office, restricted only by the most basic principles of professional ethics and the requirement
of probable cause." Id. (citations omitted).
66. Often children are charged with offenses that qualify them in adult court but are
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system is a belief that public proceedings are necessary to limit the opportunity
for abuse of governmental power. 67 As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in
Kent, the decision to transfer children to adult court is "critically important. '68
If prosecutors are granted the discretion to make this decision, what criteria do
they use to decide, 69 and who will scrutinize their decisions?
IV. THE IMPACT TRANSFERS HAVE HAD AROUND THE NATION
A. Which Children Are Being Sent to Adult Court?
Although the political rhetoric in support of sending children to adult
court focuses on the most violent offenders, the reality is that most children
sent to adult court are property offenders.7" Many believe that these children
sent to adult courts have exhausted all opportunities in juvenile court, but the
reality is that many children transferred to adult court have never received
juvenile court services.7 One study of the Texas procedures suggests that there
are four major factors leading children to be sent to adult court: serious
offenses, children who are almost adults, repeat offenses, and local (county)
legal cultures or differences.72
Race is often a factor in the criminal justice system, 73 and race has been
proved to be a factor in the decision to send children to adult court. Minority
convicted of offenses that wouldn't have qualified them for adult court jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Walker v. State, 309 Ark. 23, 827 S.W.2d 637, 638 (1992) (Walker was charged with first
degree murder but convicted of manslaughter.). See also Boyce, supra note 55, at 998-1000
(1994).
67. This is the justification for public trials, WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.1 (2d ed. 1992); and grand juries, see Id. §15.1(a).
68. Kent, 383 U.S. at 558 (citations omitted).
69. See Dawson, supra note 3, at 983, 1051-52 (study of transfer decisions in Texas
concluded that prosecutors use the same statutorily created criteria used by the judges).
70. See Bishop, supra note 4, at 174. But see Dawson, supra note 3, at 989-90 (showing
that prosecutors filed transfer motions at a significantly higher rate against violent offenders).
A study of Arkansas practices under the former code showed that a 92.8% of the offenses
filed against children in adult courts were drug and alcohol related or crimes against property.
See Casey, supra note 6, at 510-11.
71. See Bishop, supra note 4, at 174.
72. See Dawson, supra note 3, at 1043-51.
73. See Jeffrey Fagan et al., Blind Justice? The Impact of Race on the Juvenile Justice
Process, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 224 (1987) (showing that racial disparities in decision making
throughout the juvenile justice system). See also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 314-320
(1987) (rejecting a challenge to the death penalty as racially biased, the U.S. Supreme Court
suggests that race may permeate the criminal justice system of the United States).
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children are over represented among the children sent to adult court.74
Additionally, boys tend to be sent to adult court more than girls.
75
B. What Is Happening to Children Sent to the Adult System?
It is not clear that children sent to the adult court system are treated more
harshly.76 Once a child is transferred, he or she is processed through the
normal adult criminal system, charged or indicted and provided the procedural
rights granted criminal defendants under the Constitution and appropriate
statutes. Some of these rights would not have been given to a child who
remained in juvenile proceedings. 77
Once tried, a child may be sentenced as any adult would be sentenced.
However, some states allow sentences to juvenile facilities, 78 split sentences
between the systems,79 or special sentences for children or young adults.80
If ordered incarcerated in an adult facility, children are processed through
the adult corrections' system. The National Institute of Justice has published
a report highlighting the increased burden on the adult corrections system from
the move to transfer children to adult court.81 Children transferred to adult
prisons have different needs with respect to diet and physical exercise, require
different forms of discipline, and are at greater risk of being raped and
74. See Dawson, supra note 3, at 1022-23. Although minority children were more likely
to be chosen by the prosecutor to be transferred to adult court, the judges appeared to be more
balanced in their transfer decisions.
75. See Dawson, supra note 3, at 100 1-03, 1024.
76. See Bishop, supra note 4, at 174-75.
77. Children in juvenile proceedings do not have a constitutional right to a jury trial, see
McKeiver, 403 U.S. 528; a public hearing, see KRAMER, supra note 1, § 21.13; or bail, see
KRAMER, supra note 1, § 22.06, at 337. Although children are not constitutionally given the
right to bail, most states have provided a statutory option for bail to children pending juvenile
proceedings. See KRAMER, supra note I, § 21.13, at 293. Some states have also provided
children with a right to a jury trial and public hearing. See KRAMER supra note I, §§ 22.11, at
346, & 21.13, at 293. Often these changes have been prompted by demands for more sanctions
which have led to the need to provide more constitutional protections.
The Arkansas Juvenile Code allows for bail, see ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-326(e)(3)
(Michie Supp. 1995), and public hearings in delinquency proceedings, see ARK. CODE ANN. §
9-27-325(l) (Michie Supp. 1995), but does not permit jury trials, see ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-
325(a) (Michie Supp. 1995).
78. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 39.062 and 39.059 (West Supp. 1997); CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 1731.5 (West 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-285.1 (Repl. Michie 1996).
79. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-28-403 (Michie 1995) (But see infra part VII.B.2);
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1731.5 (West 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-601 (West
1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46(b)-I 33(c) (West 1997); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.04(3)
(West 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-272(A)(1) (Repl. Michie 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
260.126 (West Supp. 1997); MO. STAT. ANN. § 211.073 (West 1996).
80. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 39.062 and 39.059 (West Supp. 1997).
81. See Parent et al., supra note 24.
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assaulted.8 2 These factors impose additional costs to the corrections systems
which are often missed in the political debate.
The National Institute of Justice describes the prison housing problem in
the following manner:
In 1994, 36 States dispersed young inmates in housing with adult
inmates (half as a general practice and half only in certain circumstances).
Nine States house young inmates with those ages 18 to 21 but not with
older inmates. Only six States never housed young inmates with people 18
and older; they either have transferred young inmates to their State juvenile
training schools until they reached the age of majority or have housed them
in segregated living units within an adult prison.
Some believe that housing young inmates with these older popula-
tions ensures they will be victimized, assaulted, and abused, both physi-
cally and sexually. Young inmates who cannot survive in such a situation
have little choice but to enter protective custody, which is usually a
separate, secure housing unit in which they spend a great deal of time in
isolation - a setting that is especially conducive to suicidal behavior.13
Adolescent prisons demand special services. Adolescent children have
special dietary needs due to the changes occurring in their bodies. Behavior
control may be difficult without special training for the staff because of normal
adolescent patterns that are different than adult behavior. Additional
programming considerations are mandated by special laws regarding children.
Education is mandatory for children under the age of eighteen, even if they are
committed to adult prisons.8 4 If a child has special educational needs, these
must be met in prison under federal law. 5
Prior to 1975, Arkansas law required the separation of children confined
to an institution to which adult convicts are sentenced.86 Now in Arkansas,
82. See Parent et al., supra note 24, at 2.
83. See Parent et al., supra note 24, at 3.
84. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-201 (Michie Supp. 1995). This is part of the reason the
Department of Corrections has its own statewide school district.
85. See Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1485 (West
1997). Under this act the state must provide a free appropriate public education for all children
with disabilities between the ages of three and twenty-one if the state accepts federal funding.
See id. at § 1412. Arkansas accepts the federal funding and is thus bound by the Individuals
With Disabilities Education Act of 1995. See id.
86. See 1911 Ark. Acts 215, § 11. The Arkansas Juvenile Code of 1975 eliminated this
prohibition on the commingling of children with adults within the Department of Corrections.
It did, however, continue to prohibit the confining of children with adults in the same cell prior
to adjudication. See 1975 Ark. Acts 451, § 22. Although children can be incarcerated with
adults, there still is an expressed legislative intent "for the separation of youthful male offenders
from the influence of older, more intractable offenders and to provide for appropriate
educational and vocational training, counseling, and professional treatment services for youthful
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children are segregated by risk factors like any other inmate. 7 The inmates
under the age of twenty-one tend to be located in the Varner Unit but there is
no prohibition against the commingling of different aged inmates.88 This
central location is chosen by the Arkansas Department of Corrections to
coordinate the provision of services including special education services.8 9
V. THE LAW IN ARKANSAS
A. Arkansas Statute - A Balance of Power
1. The History of the Juvenile Code
The Arkansas juvenile justice system began with the creation of a reform
school in 1905.90 This first act merely called for the separation of children
under the age of eighteen who were convicts in the penitentiary. 9' In 1907, the
first juvenile court was created in Arkansas. 92 County judges were given
authority "to have brought before them all children between the ages of three
and fifteen years, whom they know, and who are reported to them to live in
notorious resorts of bad character. . 9'
The legislative goal of rehabilitation adopted in the 1907 code has
remained throughout the years as the goal of the juvenile justice system in
offenders." ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-28-402 (Michie 1995).
Arkansas cases have never addressed the constitutionality of incarcerating children with
adults, but an Indiana court recently ruled that incarceration of children with adults violated the
Indiana constitution. See Ratliff v. Cohn, No. 49A02-961 I -CV-739, 1997 WL 242784 (Ind. Ct.
App. May 13, 1997) (fourteen-year-old girl was sentenced to twenty-five years for burning
down her home and killing her mother and sister. She was committed to the Indiana Women's
Prison and filed a lawsuit demanding a transfer to a juvenile facility. The court of appeals found
that the "framers of the Indiana Constitution intended to abolish the practice of incarcerating
juveniles with adult offenders" and ordered her transferred to a juvenile facility.).
87. Telephone Interview with Dr. Max Mobley, Deputy Director of Health and
Correctional programs for the Arkansas Department of Corrections ( June 9, 1997).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See 1905 Ark. Acts 199.
91. See id. § 1.
92. See 1907 Ark. Acts 237.
93. Id. § 1. The act does not make a distinction between delinquent and dependent
children. Both children would be brought before the county judge and the judge would be
permitted to either send the child to the reform school or find the child a suitable home. See id.
See also Casey, supra note 6, at 503-04. This lack of a distinction as it applied to disposition
continued until 1921. In 192 1, the legislature passed a law prohibiting the commitment of "any
dependent or neglected child or children to an institution or home used for the care,
imprisonment or reformation of delinquent children or adult criminals." 1921 Ark. Acts I 10.
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Arkansas.94 The purposes as defined in the 1911 act are very similar to the
purposes in the modem juvenile code:
This Act shall be liberally construed to the end that its purpose may be
carried out, to-wit: That the care, custody and discipline of the child shall
approximate as nearly as may be that which should be given it by its
parents, and in all cases of dependency where it can properly be done, that
the child shall be placed in an approved family home, and become a
member of a home and family by legal adoption or otherwise, and in cases
of delinquency, that as far as practicable any delinquent child shall be
treated not as a criminal, but as misdirected and misguided and needing
aid, encouragement and assistance, and if such child can not be properly
cared for and corrected in its own home or with the assistance and help of
the probation officers, then that it may be placed in a suitable institution
where it may be helped and educated and equipped for industrial efficiency
and useful citizenship. 95
Prior to 1975, adult criminal courts and the county "juvenile" courts had
concurrent jurisdiction over all children charged with crimes.96 The defini-
tional age of a child changed as the code developed and now is basically an
94. The original 1905 Act which created the first reform school in Arkansas states "[t]hat
for the discipline, education, employment and reformation of convicts in the penitentiary, under
the age of eighteen years, an institution to be known as the State Reform School shall be, and
is hereby established .... 1905 Ark. Acts 199, § 1. See also 1907 Ark. Acts 237 (explaining
that the county judge was to make a dispositional decision that would "be to the best interest
of the moral, mental, and physical welfare of such child."); 1911 Ark. Acts 215, § 17; 1921
Ark. Acts 404, § 4 (stating that the prosecutor's role was "to aid in the redemption of such child
from delinquency .. "); Cantrell v. Goldberger, 256 Ark. 784, 510 S.W.2d 546 (1974)
(Fogelman, J., dissenting). Justice Fogelman explains:
It was not the intention of the act to confer upon the county court the power
to institute criminal prosecutions against minors or to punish for alleged
violations of law. It did undertake reclamation and reformation, rather than
condemnation and punishment and to open the doors of an asylum rather than
a jail. Through it, the state, as parens patriae, assumes the guardianship of her
minors who are under the age of 18 because they come within the terms of the
act and need her protection.
Id. at 791, 510 S.W.2d at 550-51 (Fogelman, J., dissenting).
95. 1911 Ark. Acts 215, § 17. Cf. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-303 (Michie Supp. 1995).
96. Prior to 1907, the adult criminal courts handled all offenses committed by children.
See Casey, supra note 6, at 502. In 1907, county courts were also given jurisdiction over
children aged three to fifteen. See 1907 Ark. Acts 237. This act did not mention the jurisdiction
of the criminal courts. So, presumably they had concurrent jurisdiction. In 1911, it was made
clear that the county courts had concurrent jurisdiction with other courts having "jurisdiction
of the offense." 1911 Ark. Acts. 215, § 10. In 1989, the juvenile court was transferred from the
county courts to the Juvenile Division of Chancery Courts. See 1989 Ark. Acts 273, § 3(8).
This was in response to an Arkansas Supreme Court decision that found the county courts could
not constitutionally maintain jurisdiction over juvenile proceedings. See Walker v. Arkansas
Dept. of Human Servs., 291 Ark. 43, 722 S.W.2d 558 (1987).
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individual under the age of eighteen.97 In 1975, the juvenile courts were given
exclusive jurisdiction of children "less than fifteen (15) years of age at the time
of the conduct alleged to constitute the offense." 98 From 1975 through 1981,
the courts retained concurrent jurisdiction over children aged fifteen through
seventeen." In 1981, concurrent jurisdiction was expanded to include
fourteen-year-olds who committed certain enumerated offenses.'0° In 1989, the
jurisdictional limits were changed to provide exclusive jurisdiction to juvenile
court for all misdemeanor offenses committed by children under the age of
eighteen.'01 For children below the age of fourteen, exclusive jurisdiction was
vested in juvenile court regardless of the offense.'0 2 However, for children
aged fourteen through seventeen jurisdiction was concurrent depending on the
felony offense and the prosecutor was granted discretion to decide in which
court to file charges.
0 3
Prior to 1981, the specific offense committed by the child did not affect
the question of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of juvenile courts was based
solely on the age of the child at the time the offense was committed. In 1981,
the legislature drafted the first list of offenses that qualified fourteen-year-olds
for circuit court jurisdiction."° Initially, these qualifying offenses included
only murder and rape."°5 Since 1989, when the juvenile code had its last major
revisions, most of the changes to the transfer section of the code have involved
the addition of offenses to the enumerated list of offenses that could be charged
97. The 1907 Act gave county judges jurisdiction of children aged 3 to 15. See 1907 Ark.
Acts 237. In 1911, the juvenile court was given jurisdiction of all children under the age of 21.
See 1911 Ark. Acts 215, § 1. In 1963, the age of delinquent children was "limited to children
of both sexes under the age of eighteen (18) years, whether married or single." 1963 Ark. Acts
542, § I. Juvenile court jurisdiction has basically remained at eighteen since that time, but
when a child is brought before the juvenile court before his or her eighteenth birthday, the court
can maintain jurisdiction until the child turns twenty-one years old. 1989 Ark. Acts 273, § 3(1)
(codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-303(1) (Michie Supp. 1995)).
98. 1975 Ark. Acts 280, § 617(1).
99. See id.
100. See 1981 Ark. Acts 793, § 1. See also 1983 Ark. Acts 904, § I (correcting an error in
the 1981 act which actually reduced exclusive jurisdiction ofjuvenile court to age 13).
101. See 1989 Ark. Acts 273, § 17(a)(2).
102. See id.
103. See id. § 17(b)-(c).
104. See 1981 Ark. Acts 793, § 1.
105. See id.
If a person fourteen (14) years of age commits capital felony murder, first degree
murder, second degree murder or rape such person may be prosecuted by the
prosecuting attorney at his discretion, or if the prosecutor does not choose to
prosecute such person, proceedings shall be instituted against such person in the
appropriate juvenile court.
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in adult court against fourteen and fifteen-year-old children.'06 Now there are
at least forty-four qualifying offenses that permit prosecution of a fourteen or
fifteen-year-old child in adult court.'07
Arkansas has never adopted a rule that the juvenile courts must review
every transfer decision.' Juvenile courts and the adult criminal courts have
always shared this responsibility.'09
Initially, judges in Arkansas were not given any standards to consider
when reviewing a transfer case.e"0 In 1981, the legislature limited the judges'
review to the consideration of the following factors:
106. See 1997 Ark. Acts 1299, § 7; 1995 Ark. Acts 797; 1994 Ark. Acts 40; 1993 Ark. Acts
1189, § 5; 1991 Ark. Acts 903.
107. See 1997 Ark. Acts 1299, § 7. In 1995, the legislature also added a serious offender
provision that permits the filing of a circuit court case against any child over 14 years old who
has been adjudicated delinquent three times in the past two years for offenses that would have
been felonies if committed by adults. See 1995 Ark. Acts 797, § 1.
108. The decision of which court would review a case was initially dependent on whether
the child was arrested pursuant to a warrant. In 1911, the legislature passed the first act which
discusses transfer between the courts:
When... a male child under the age of seventeen, or a female child under the age
of eighteen years, is arrested without a warrant, it shall be the duty of the officer
making the arrest to take said child directly before the juvenile court of the county
and it shall be the duty of the court, after having given the notice required by this
Act to proceed to examine said case and determine whether said child is a dependent
or a delinquent child as defined by this Act and deal with the same as herein
provided, or it shall be within the discretion of the judge of the juvenile court to
dismiss the cause therein pending and transfer such child to any of the courts of this
State having jurisdiction of the offense of which said child may be found to be
guilty; if said child be arrested upon a warrant issued out of any of the courts of this
State the judge of such court may, in his discretion, if he believes that the said child
is either a dependent or delinquent child, dismiss the charge pending in such court
and transfer such child to the juvenile court, there to be dealt with according to the
provisions and spirit of this Act.
1911 Ark. Acts 215, § 10.
In 1975 the law changed giving prosecutors more authority over this decision. See 1975
Ark. Acts 451, § 18; State v. Banks, 271 Ark. 331, 333, 609 S.W.2d 10, 12 (1980) (rejecting
the argument that the constitution requires a judicial waiver hearing before a prosecutor can file
charges in adult court.); Sargent v. Cole, 269 Ark. 121, 598 S.W. 2d 749 (1980).
109. See 1989 Ark. Acts 273, § 17(d); 1911 Ark. Acts 215, § 10. See also Cantrell, 256
Ark. 784, 510 S.W.2d 546.
110. See, e.g., 1975 Ark. Acts 451, § 20 ("[T]he judge of the court may, in his discretion,
transfer the case to any other court having jurisdiction over the matter .... "); see also 1953
Ark. Acts 263, § I
[T]he Circuit Court or the Judge thereof where such charge is pending, may, at his
discretion order and direct that the criminal charge and the file and record thereof
be transferred to the Juvenile Court of the county where the charge is pending, for
such disposition as the Juvenile Court may adjudge and determine:
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(a) The seriousness of the offense and whether violence was employed by
the juvenile in the commission of the offense.
(b) Whether the offense is part of a repetitive pattern of adjudicated
offenses which would lead to the determination that the juvenile is beyond
rehabilitation under existing rehabilitation programs, as evidenced by past
efforts to treat and rehabilitate the juvenile and the response to such efforts.
(c ) The prior history, character traits and mental maturity, and any other
factors which reflect on the juvenile's prospects for rehabilitation."'
These factors to be considered by the trial judges have basically remained the
same. However, in 1989, the language limiting the trial judge's considerations
to these factors was removed and semicolons and an "and" were added between
the factors."2 These changes implied that, while the trial judges had to
consider these three factors at a minimum, they were permitted to consider any
relevant material.
Prosecutors did not have a significant role in juvenile proceedings prior
to 1975. "3 Prior to this date, their role was to appear "as a defender on behalf
of the child for its best interest and to aid in the redemption of such child from
delinquency" when requested by the county court judge." 4 Although they did
not participate in juvenile courts, prosecutors were historically given complete
discretion to file charges against a child of any age in either adult or juvenile
court. In 1975 their discretion to file charges against children in adult court
was limited to children aged fifteen and older." 5 In 1989, their discretion was
further limited. Prosecutors were only granted discretion to file felony charges
in circuit court. " 6 Although they were given additional enumerated offenses
for which they could file circuit court charges against fourteen-year-olds, their
111. 1981 Ark. Acts 398, § I. This act was clearly intended as a limitation on the judges.
The act stated that "the court shall consider only the following factors." Id. (emphasis added).
112. See 1989 Ark. Acts 273, § 17(e).
113. See 1975 Ark. Acts 451, §12 (defining the prosecuting attorney's duty as follows:
"[W]hen requested by the juvenile court, [he or she is] to aid and counsel in the presentation
of evidence supporting a petition in any case arising under this Act.").
114. 1921 Ark. Acts 404, § 4. See also Casey, supra note 6 at 504-05.
115. See 1975 Ark. Acts 280, § 617(1)-(2). There was a conflict between the Arkansas
Criminal Code and the Arkansas Juvenile Code both passed in 1975. The Criminal Code vested
exclusive jurisdiction over children under the age of 15 in the juvenile courts, See id. § 617(1),
while the Arkansas Juvenile Code of 1975 required the juvenile judge to "notify the appropriate
prosecuting authority who shall decide whether to (1) file a petition with the juvenile court, or
(2) seek a criminal indictment or file a criminal information" for any child arrested over the age
of twelve. 1975 Ark. Acts 451, § 18. This confusion was eliminated in 1975 when the juvenile
code was modified to clarify that juvenile court jurisdiction was exclusive for children under
the age of fifteen. See 1979 Ark. Acts 815, § 3.
116. See 1989 Ark. Acts 273, § 17(a)(2).
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discretion to file charges other than the enumerated ones against fifteen-year-
olds was limited.17
The burden of proof in transfer cases was not clear from the earlier acts.
In 1975, the burden of proof was first mentioned." 8 At that time, the burden
was "on the person charged to establish age to the satisfaction of the court."" 9
In the 1989 revisions of the Act, the burden was not mentioned, but a judge
was only permitted to try a child as an adult if the judge found "by clear and
convincing evidence that a juvenile should be tried as an adult."' 20 This would
imply that the burden is on the state to justify the effort to try a child as an
adult.' 2'
2. The Code Today
After this history, Arkansas has a system in which the legislature has
maintained the prospects for rehabilitation for any child under eighteen.'22
However, prosecutors are given discretion to file charges in adult court against
certain children who, because of age and offense, qualify for consideration by
an adult court. 23 This prosecutorial discretion is, at least in theory, balanced
by judicial review in either adult or juvenile court. 124
a. The Prosecutor's Role
If a prosecutor is going to file charges against a child under fourteen years
of age for what would be a crime if committed by an adult, he or she must file
those charges in juvenile court."'5 If a prosecutor is going to file misdemeanor
117. In 1989, prosecutors were granted the authority to file the additional offenses of
kidnaping and aggravated robbery charges in circuit court against 14 year-olds. See 1989 Ark.
Acts 273, § I 7(b)(1). However, they lost the complete discretion to file any charges against 15
year-olds in circuit courts. In 1989, they were restricted to filing murder, kidnaping, aggravated
robbery and rape charges against fourteen or fifteen year-olds. See id.
118. See 1975 Ark. Acts 280, § 617(3).
119. Id. It would appear that the only burden on the child was to establish his age. At that
point, the court was to determine whether "because of age the proceeding is barred or referral
to the juvenile court is appropriate ... ." Id.
120. 1989 Ark. Acts 273, § 17(0.
121. But see infra part V.B.4.
122. Arkansas has not adopted the policy of some states of lowering the jurisdictional age
ofjuvenile court. Juvenile court can still exercise jurisdiction over all children under the age
of eighteen. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-306(a) and 9-27-303(1) (Michie Supp. 1995).
123. See infra part V.A.2.a.
124. See infra part V.A.2.b.
125. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(a)(1) (Michie Supp. 1995) states "A juvenile court has
exclusive jurisdiction when a delinquency case involves a juvenile: (1) less than fourteen (14)
years old when the alleged delinquent act occurred." Id. Although delinquent act is not defined
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charges against any person under the age of eighteen, he or she must file those
charges in juvenile court.126 A prosecutor has discretion to file any felony
charges against a child aged sixteen and seventeen in either juvenile or circuit
court. 27 A prosecutor may file charges in circuit court on a fourteen or fifteen-
year-old only if the offense is one of the statutorily enumerated offenses 28 or
by the Code, a delinquent juvenile is defined as:
any juvenile ten (10) years or older who has committed an act other than a
traffic offense or game and fish violation which, if such act had been
committed by an adult, would subject such adult to prosecution for a felony,
misdemeanor, or violation under the applicable criminal law of this state, or
who has violated § 5-73-119 [involving the possession of a handgun by a
minor].
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-303(11) (Michie Supp. 1995).
A child under the age often who has committed what would be a criminal offense if he
or she was an adult can be brought before the juvenile court with a family in need of services
petition. See Byler v. State, 306 Ark. 37, 810 S.W.2d 941 (1991).
126. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(a)(3) (Michie Supp. 1995) (stating that "[a] juvenile
court has exclusive jurisdiction when a delinquency case involves a juvenile: ... [l]ess than
eighteen (18) years old when he engages in conduct that, if committed by an adult, would be
any misdemeanor.").
127. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(b)(1) (Michie Supp. 1995) states that "[a] circuit court
and a juvenile court have concurrent jurisdiction and a prosecuting attorney may charge a
juvenile in either court when a case involves a juvenile: ... [a]t least sixteen (16) years old
when he engages in conduct that, if committed by an adult, would be any felony."
128. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(b)(2) (as modified by 1997 Ark. Acts 1299, § 7) states:
A circuit court and a juvenile court have concurrent jurisdiction and a
prosecuting attorney may charge a juvenile in either court when a case
involves a juvenile: . .. [f]ourteen (14) or fifteen (15) years old when he
engages in conduct that, if committed by an adult, would be:
(A) Capital murder, §5-10-101;
(B) Murder in the first degree, § 5-10-102;
(C) Murder in the second degree, § 5-10-103;
(D) Kidnaping, § 5-11-102;
(E) Aggravated robbery, § 5-12-103;
(F) Rape, § 5-14-103;
(G) Battery in the first degree, § 5-13-201;
(H) Battery in the second degree in violation of§ 5-13-202(a)(2), (3), or (4);
(I) Possession of a handgun on school property, § 5-73-119(a)(2)(A);
(J) Aggravated assault, § 5-13-204;
(K) Terroristic act, § 5-13-3 10;
(L) Unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, § 5-74-107;
(M) Any felony committed while armed with a firearm;
(N) Soliciting a minor to join a criminal street gang, § 5-74-203;
(0) Criminal use of prohibited weapons, § 5-73-104;
(P) First degree escape, § 5-54-110;
(Q) Second degree escape, § 5-54-111; or
(R) A felony attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit any of the
following offenses: (i) Capital murder, § 5-10-101; (ii) Murder in the first
degree, § 5-10-102; (iii) Murder in the second degree, § 5-10-103; (iv)
Kidnapping, § 5-11-102; (v) Aggravated robbery, § 5-12-103; (vi) Rape, § 5-
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the child is an habitual juvenile offender as defined in the code. 2 9 The
triggering date for jurisdiction is the age of the child when he or she committed
the offense. 3° There are no guidelines in Arkansas for a prosecutor to follow
in deciding which children to bring to adult court.
Once a prosecutor has made a decision to file charges in circuit court,
circuit court jurisdiction attaches from the pleadings.1 31 Once a prosecutor files
a criminal information or delinquency petition, the circuit or juvenile court
maintains jurisdiction unless a request for a transfer is made and granted.
Conviction for a lesser included offense that is not among the enumerated
offenses does not deprive the circuit court ofjurisdiction.3 2 If the prosecutor
has filed charges in circuit court and there are related offenses arising out of the
same incident for which juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction, the state must
file these related offenses in juvenile court and seek a transfer to circuit court
to be joined with any circuit court charges pending at that time.133
14-103; (vii) Battery in the first degree, § 5-13-201, (viii) First degree escape,
§ 5-54-110; and (ix) Second degree escape, § 5-54-1 11.
129. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(b)(4) (Michie Supp. 1995):
A circuit court and a juvenile court have concurrent jurisdiction and a
prosecuting attorney may charge a juvenile in either court when a case
involves a juvenile: ... [a]t least fourteen (14) years old when he engages in
conduct that, if committed by an adult, constitutes a felony and who has,
within the preceding two (2) years, three (3) times been adjudicated as a
delinquent juvenile for acts that would have constituted a felony [sic] if they
had been committed by an adult.
Id.
130. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318 (a)-(b) (Michie Supp. 1995).
131. See Walker, 309 Ark. at 28, 827 S.W.2d at 640 (ruling that the issue for initial
jurisdiction is not what offense the child committed, but what offense the prosecutor has
charged).
132. See Jensen v. State, 328 Ark. 349,944 S.W.2d 820 (1997); Walker, 309 Ark. 23, 827
S.W.2d 637.
133. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(a) (Michie Supp. 1995). See also Butler v. State,
324 Ark. 476, 481-82, 922 S.W.2d 685, 689 (1996).
The most judicially efficient manner for the state to proceed in these cases involving both
enumerated and non-enumerated offenses would be for the state to file the enumerated offenses
in circuit court and refrain from filing the non-enumerated charges until after a transfer hearing
in circuit court. If the case is transferred to juvenile court, the state can ask to amend the
petition to add the non-enumerated offenses. If the case remains in adult court, the state can file
the non-enumerated offenses in juvenile court and seek a transfer of those offenses to adult
court. If a prosecutor files the enumerated offense in circuit court at the same time he or she
files the non-enumerated offenses in juvenile court, there could be two conflicting court
proceedings occurring at the same time. Id.
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b. The Judge's Role 3'
A prosecutor's decision to file charges in either circuit or juvenile court
is not binding on the judge. Upon a motion of the court or any of the parties,
the judge must "conduct a hearing to determine whether to retain jurisdiction
or to transfer the case to another court having jurisdiction.' 35 Following such
a motion, a judge must find by clear and convincing evidence that the child
"should be tried as an adult" before the child can be tried as an adult. 36 This
decision of the court may be appealed by any of the parties.
137
The judge's responsibilities in the transfer decision making process are
detailed in the code:
In making the decision to retain jurisdiction or to transfer the case, the
court shall consider the following factors:
(1) The seriousness of the offense, and whether violence was employed by the
juvenile in the commission of the offense;
(2) Whether the offense is part of a repetitive pattern of adjudicated offenses
which would lead to the determination that the juvenile is beyond rehabilitation
under existing rehabilitation programs, as evidence by past efforts to treat and
rehabilitate the juvenile and the response to such efforts; and
(3) The prior history, character traits, mental maturity, and any other factor
which reflects upon the juvenile's prospects for rehabilitation. 38
i. The Offense
In making the decision to retain jurisdiction or to transfer the case, the
court shall consider the following factors: (1) The seriousness of the
offense, and whether violence was employed by the juvenile in the
commission of the offense ....
The Arkansas Code requires the judge to consider both whether the
offense is serious and whether the child used violence in commission of the
offense. These are separate factors that can and should be considered
separately. 14 This statutory language would appear to require a specific
134. When reading the appellate cases on transfers in Arkansas, it is important to remember
that the majority of these cases are appeals from proceedings in circuit court and the request for
transfer is a request for the case to be transferred to juvenile court.
135. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(d) (Michie Supp. 1995).
136. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(f) (Michie Supp. 1995).
137. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(h) (Michie Supp. 1995).
138. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(e) (Michie Supp. 1995).
139. Id.
140. See Blevins v. State, 308 Ark. 613, 826 S.W.2d 265 (1992) (seriousness of the offense
can be considered separate from violence). Although the dissent in this case argues that the
majority was holding that violence had to be employed for circuit court to retain jurisdiction,
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inquiry into the particulars of the offense. Almost all the enumerated offenses
that can be charged against fourteen and fifteen-year olds in circuit court are
serious and violent. There would be no need for the judge to review the nature
of the offense if the charging document were legally sufficient to keep a child
in adult court. But the courts have found that the act of a prosecutor charging
a child with a serious violent offense is sufficient by itself to keep a child in
adult court.14' However, a serious offense without a finding of violence is not
a factor sufficient by itself to keep a child in adult court. 42
Another surprising ruling by the Arkansas Supreme Court is that violence
committed during an offense can count against the child even if he or she
didn't commit the violence.143 Given that almost all the offenses serious
subsequent decisions make it clear that the seriousness of the offense can be considered even
in the absence of violence. See id. at 619-620, 826 S.W.2d at 268 (Brown, J., dissenting);
McClure v. State, 328 Ark. 35, 942 S.W.2d 243 (1997); Bright v. State, 307 Ark. 250, 819
S.W.2d 7 (1991) (denial of a request to transfer a case to juvenile court affirmed even though
there were no acts of violence committed).
141. Following the writing of this article but shortly before it was printed, the Arkansas
Supreme Court reversed its holding on this issue. The court concluded that "there must be some
evidence to substantiate the serious and violent nature of the charges contained in the
information." Thompson v. State, No. 97-339, slip op. at 6 (Dec. 11, 1997). See Carroll v.
State, 326 Ark. 882, 934 S.W.2d 523 (1996) (murder); Sanders v. State, 326 Ark. 415, 932
S.W.2d 315 (1996) (terroristic threatening and aggravated assault); Butler, 324 Ark. 476, 922
S.W.2d 685 (aggravated robbery); Cole v. State, 323 Ark. 136, 913 S.W.2d 779 (1996) (ruling
that a charge of aggravated assault is enough to permit the trial of a child in adult court.).
However, the court is not clear whether the second count of possession of a handgun on school
property does not also qualify as a sufficiently violent offense to keep a child in adult court).
See id. at 142, 913 S.W.2d at 782; Holmes, 322 Ark. 574, 911 S.W.2d 256 (aggravated
robbery); Ring v. State, 320 Ark. 128, 894 S.W.2d 944 (1995) (rape); Davis v. State, 319 Ark.
613, 893 S.W.2d 768 (1995) (rape); Vickers v. State, 307 Ark. 298, 819 S.W.2d 13 (1991)
(murder); Walker v. State, 304 Ark. 393, 803 S.W.2d 502 (1991) (murder). See also Brooks
v. State, 326 Ark. 201, 929 S.W.2d 160 (1996) (the court does not address the state's argument
that statutory rape is inherently violent because the allegations in this case involved violence).
See id. at 204, 929 S.W.2d at 161. But see Green v. State, 323 Ark. 635, 916 S.W.2d 756
(1996) (information charging manslaughter but not alleging the use of violence is not sufficient
to keep a child in adult court).
It is interesting to note that the courts have moved from allowing a charge of murder to
be in and of itself enough to keep a child in adult court to allowing a charge of terroristic
threatening to be in and of itself enough to keep a child in adult court. This move to allow
lesser offenses to qualify children for adult court corresponds with the legislatures move in this
same direction. See supra part V.A. 1.
142. See Sebastian v. State, 318 Ark. 494, 498, 885 S.W.2d 882, 885 (1994). See also
Maddox v. State, 326 Ark. 515, 519-20, 931 S.W.2d 438, 441 (1996) (throwing of a soda bottle
at a moving vehicle is a sufficiently violent act to keep a child in adult court even if they are
merely charged with criminal mischief); Green, 323 Ark. at 635, 916 S.W.2d at 756; Cole, 323
Ark. at 142, 913 S.W.2d at 782. The court makes it clear that violence is not necessary. A
serious offense when combined with evidence on the other two factors can make a child eligible
for adult court. See McClure, 328 Ark. at 40, 942 S.W.2d at 246.
143. See Carroll, 326 Ark. at 885, 934 S.W.2d at 524-25; Butler, 324 Ark. at 484, 922
S.W.2d at 690; Lammers v. State, 324 Ark. 222, 225, 920 S.W.2d 7, 9 (1996); Guy v. State,
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enough to allow a prosecutor to file an adult charge against a child fourteen or
fifteen years old are violent offenses, the court's ruling seems to ignore the
clear wording of the statute requiring courts to consider both the seriousness
of the offense and whether the juvenile used violence. The statute's specific
consideration of whether the child used violence is intended to prevent the
transfer of a child who was involved in a violent offense but who did not
actually participate in the violence.
In Johnson v. State,'" the court misinterprets this factor to be "the
seriousness of the offense and whether it involved violence."'45 Although this
language has not been followed in any subsequent opinions, the court's rulings
permitting the mere charging of a violent offense to be a sufficient basis upon
which to keep a child in adult court have the same effect.'
4
ii. Prior Adjudications
In making the decision to retain jurisdiction or to transfer the case, the
court shall consider the following factors: ... (2) Whether the offense is
part of a repetitive pattern of adjudicated offenses which would lead to the
determination that the juvenile is beyond rehabilitation under existing
rehabilitation programs, as evidence by past efforts to treat and rehabilitate
the juvenile and the response to such efforts .... 147
This second factor permits the court to consider a history of prior juvenile
adjudications. However, this factor appears to be misconstrued by trial and
appellate judges on a regular basis. It appears that the judges believe that a
regular pattern of criminal conduct suffices, 48 but the language of the Code is
clear that it is a "repetitive pattern of adjudicated offenses" that triggers this
factor. 149 Criminal conduct that has not lead to an adjudication can be
323 Ark. 649,654,916 S.W.2d 760, 763 (1996); Bell v. State, 317 Ark. 289, 292, 877 S.W.2d
579, 581 (1994) ("An accomplice is responsible for the activities of his cohort."); Walter v.
State, 317 Ark. 274, 277, 878 S.W.2d 374, 375 (1994) ("The circuit court correctly concluded
that his association with the gunman in committing the alleged robberies and thefts were [sic]
enough to satisfy the criterion.").
144. 317 Ark. 521, 878 S.W.2d 758 (1994).
145. Id. at 523, 878 S.W.2d at 759.
146. See infra parts V.B. 1-2.
147. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(e) (Michie Supp. 1995).
148. See, e.g., Collins, 322 Ark. at 163,908 S.W.2d at 81. The offense that brings the child
into adult court may also have occurred prior to the rehabilitative efforts. See Estes v. State,
1994 WL 245504 (Ark. App. 1994) (aggravated robbery occurred prior to juvenile court efforts
beginning).
149. APK. CODE ANN. §9-27-318(e)(2) (Michie Supp. 1995) (emphasis added). The trial
judge in Hansen v. State seemed to understand that a series of pending offenses does not make
a "pattern of adjudicated offenses." 323 Ark. 407, 914 S.W.2d 737 (1996). See also Macon v.
State, 323 Ark. 498, 499-500, 915 S.W.2d 273, 274 (1996). But see Butler, 324 Ark. 476, 922
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considered under the third factor of the transfer statute, but does not appropri-
ately fall under this section.
If there are no prior adjudications, this factor obviously favors the child
seeking to be transferred to juvenile court. If there are any prior adjudications,
the courts generally assume that the child's involvement in a subsequent'
offense bringing him or her to court again proves that the efforts have not been
successful. 50 Thus, even if a child has responded well to rehabilitation efforts,
the mere fact that he is a repeat offender is generally sufficient to satisfy this
factor.
iii. The Character of the Child
In making the decision to retain jurisdiction or to transfer the case, the
court shall consider the following factors: . . . (3) The prior history,
character traits, mental maturity, and any other factor which reflects upon
the juvenile's prospects for rehabilitation.'
This third factor is the catch-all category that allows the admission of any
testimony relevant to the character of the child and his likelihood of rehabilita-
tion, including school records,5 2 prior social interventions,'53 intelligence,
54
S.W.2d 685 (pending juvenile charges for burglary and theft are entered into the transfer
hearing, but it does not seem to have been influential to the court's decision).
150. Prior efforts may not be a complete predictor of future success. One has to expect
some level of failure from a child who has lacked structure and support in his or her life. The
better gauge should be progress not success. See, e.g., Estes, 1994 WL 245504 (probation
officer reports that the'child has about thirty juvenile offenses but predicts the child's prospects
for rehabilitation are good).
151. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(e) (Michie Supp. 1995).
152. See, e.g., Ring, 320 Ark. at 128, 894 S.W.2d at 944; Slay v. State, 309 Ark. 507, 832
S.W.2d 217 (1992).
153. See, e.g., Butler, 324 Ark. at 476, 479-80, 922 S.W.2d at 685, 688-89 (both parents
and a program director present evidence of past treatment efforts); Holmes, 322 Ark. at 574, 911
S.W.2d at 256 (mother testified that efforts, including hospitalization for drug or alcohol
addiction, to address problems had not been successful); Walter, 317 Ark. at 274, 878 S.W.2d
at 374 (witness testified about the child's involvement in an anti-violence program).
154. See, e.g., Carroll, 326 Ark. at 885, 934 S.W.2d at 524; Ring, 320 Ark. at 128, 894
S.W.2d at 944; Allen v. State, 253 Ark. 732,488 S.W.2d 712 (1973). The children charged with
offenses in both of these cases were mildly mentally retarded. See also Sims v. State, 320 Ark.
528, 900 S.W.2d 508 (1995) (the child was described as "a strongly dependent character whose
borderline intelligence and developmental lags [cause him to] look to outsiders for guidance in
complex situations.") Id. at 535-36, 900 S.W.2d at 512.
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age,' criminal conduct that may not have led to a prior adjudication' 56 or
courtroom demeanor." 7
Often there is favorable testimony about the child, but it does not appear
to be given great weight. 5 8 The quality of testimony provided under this
category also seems weak. Often the only testimony offered involves the child,
parents, or friends.'" Without expert testimony about the child' 60 and the
155. Although age is a permissible consideration, it should not be the overriding
consideration suggested by the Arkansas Supreme Court. See Jensen, 328 Ark. 349, 944 S.W.2d
820; McClure, 328 Ark. at 35, 942 S.W.2d at 243; Carroll, 326 Ark. at 885, 934 S.W.2d at 525;
Jones v. State, 326 Ark. 681, 684, 933 S.W.2d 387, 389 (1996); Maddox, 326 Ark. at 520, 931
S.W.2d at 441; Sanders, 326 Ark. at 422, 932 S.W.2d at 319; Brooks 326 Ark. at 204-05, 929
S.W.2d at 162; Macon, 323 Ark. at 498, 915 S.W.2d at 273; Hansen, 323 Ark. at 410-11 , 914
S.W.2d at 739; McGaughy v. State, 321 Ark. 537, 539, 906 S.W.2d 671, 673 (1995); Myers
v. State, 317 Ark. 70, 71-72, 876 S.W.2d 246, 247-48 (1994); Wicker v. State, 310 Ark. 580,
839 S.W.2d 186 (1992); Bright, 307 Ark. at 252, 819 S.W.2d at 8.
156. See, e.g., Macon, 323 Ark. at 499, 915 S.W.2d at 274; Hansen, 323 Ark. at 407, 914
S.W.2d at 738. This can also include criminal activity subsequent to the adult charge. See
Booker v. State, 324 Ark. 468, 475, 922 S.W.2d 337, 340-341 (1996).
157. See McGaughy, 321 Ark. at 540, 906 S.W.2d at 674.
158. See Green, 323 Ark. at 638, 916 S.W.2d at 758 (although several witnesses testified
about the child, the court only mentions the "type of person" the child is but doesn't elaborate
on what that means). See also Maddox, 326 Ark. at 515, 931 S.W.2d at 438; Walter, 317 Ark.
at 277, 878 S.W.2d at 375; Banks v. State, 306 Ark. 273, 813 S.W.2d 256 (1991).
159. See Smith v. State, 328 Ark. 736, 946 S.W.2d 667 (1997) (two aunts testify for the
defense); McClure, 328 Ark. at 35, 942 S.W.2d at 243 (the child, his mother and the church
youth director testified); Maddox, 326 Ark. at 520, 931 S.W.2d at 441 (the child's mother
testified); Sanders, 326 Ark. at 415, 932 S.W.2d at 315 (the mother testified); Booker, 324 Ark.
at 468, 922 S.W.2d at 337 (child and both parents testified); Hansen, 323 Ark. at 407, 914
S.W.2d at 737 (mother testified); Cole, 323 Ark. at 136, 913 S.W.2d at 779 (stepfather
testified); Collins, 322 Ark. at 161, 908 S.W.2d at 80 (mother testified); Davis, 319 Ark. at 613,
893 S.W.2d at 768 (child testified); Sebastian, 318 Ark. at 494, 885 S.W.2d at 882 (child
testified); Johnson, 317 Ark. at 521, 878 S.W.2d at 758 (grandmother and father testified about
planned family interventions if the child were sent to juvenile court.); Walter, 317 Ark. at 274,
878 S.W.2d at 374 (mother and friend of family testify about his potential for rehabilitation;
another witness testifies about his participation in a program, but it is not clear whether they
provided any additional information for the court).
160. There have been cases with expert testimony about the child, but the testimony tends
to be focused on traditional culpability evaluations such as those used for an insanity defense
or intelligence tests. See Kindle v. State, 326 Ark. 282, 931 S.W.2d 117 (1996) (psychiatrist and
three school officials testified); Carroll, 326 Ark. at 882, 934 S.W.2d at 524 (psychologist
testifies about the child's I.Q.); Butler, 324 Ark. at 476, 922 S.W.2d at 685 (program
administrator testified); Green, 323 Ark. at 635, 916 S.W.2d at 756 (psychologist testified);
Hamilton v. State, 320 Ark. 346, 896 S.W.2d 877 (1995) (psychologist testified.); Bell, 317
Ark. at 289, 877 S.W.2d at 579 (psychologist testified). Better testimony may be provided by
a qualified social worker who could do a complete psycho-social assessment of a child to
explain potential environmental factors affecting the child's conduct and not merely his mental
state.
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system,' the trial courts do not have much evidence upon which to give this
factor great weight.
B. Arkansas Courts - Disturbing the Balance'62
Although the Arkansas legislature has maintained its commitment to the
purposes of the Juvenile Code regarding the desire to rehabilitate as many
children as possible, 163 the Arkansas Courts have tended to rule in favor of
transferring children to adult court without adequate consideration of the
161. The expert testimony about the juvenile justice system tends to be from probation
officers or intake officers and is not complimentary of the system's ability to handle difficult
children. This testimony often supports a finding that the system cannot meet the needs of the
child seeking return to juvenile court. See, e.g., Guy, 323 Ark. at 652, 916 S.W.2d at 762;
Collins, 322 Ark. at 165, 908 S.W.2d at 82.
162. It is difficult to conclude what happens in the trial courts of Arkansas without a study
of the practice. The only information available about the practice are the opinions of the
appellate courts. There have been studies of the court practices in other states. See, e.g., Robert
0. Dawson, An Empirical Study of Kent Style Juvenile Transfers to Criminal Court, 23 ST.
MARY'S L. J. 975 (1992).
163. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-302 (Michie 1993) states:
This subchapter shall be liberally construed to the end that its purposes may
be carried out:
(I) To assure that all juveniles brought to the attention of the courts receive the
guidance, care, and control, preferably in each juvenile's own home, which
will best serve the emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the juvenile and
the best interests of the state;
(2) To preserve and strengthen the juveniles' family ties whenever possible,
removing him from the custody of his parents only when his welfare or the
safety and protection of the public cannot adequately be safeguarded without
such removal; and, when the juvenile is removed from his own family, to
secure for him custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to
that which should have been given by his parents; and to assure, in all cases
in which a juvenile must be permanefitly removed from the custody of his
parents, that the juvenile be placed in an approved family home and be made
a member of the family by adoption;
(3) To protect society more effectively by substituting for retributive
punishment, whenever possible, methods of offender rehabilitation and
rehabilitative restitution, recognizing that the application of sanctions which
are consistent with the seriousness of the offense is appropriate in all cases;
(4) To provide means through which the provisions of this subchapter are
executed and enforced and in which the parties are assured a fair hearing and
their constitutional and other legal rights recognized and enforced.
(Emphasis added).
19971
UALR LAW JOURNAL
statutorily mandated factors, thereby rejecting the prospect of rehabilitation."6
1. The Courts Abdicate Their Judicial Role
While the United States Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the
judicial role in the critically important decision regarding the transfer of a child
to adult court, 65 Arkansas courts have been willing to abdicate this responsibil-
ity to others, including police officers. As early as 1974, the Arkansas
Supreme Court was permitting police and prosecutors to file charges against
children in adult court.66 Although the statute permitted prosecutors to bring
children directly into circuit court if there had been a warrant issued for the
child's arrest, 16 7 the statute made it clear that when a child was arrested without
a warrant he or she must be brought before a juvenile court. 68 However, in
Cantrell v. Goldberger,69 the Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that a police
officer could decide within which court children should be processed: "[i]t
appears from this statute that the [police] officers may elect as to the manner
in which they are to proceed; i.e. whether the child should be taken before the
juvenile court as a delinquent or charged in criminal court under a separate
crime or misdemeanor."'
' 70
164. As Justice Roaf explains, the present practice of sending children to adult court does
not serve the children or the state.
Children between the ages of 14 and 17 years are paying the price for our
failures. We cannot even take comfort in the notion that the best interests of
the state are being served, for many of these juveniles will return to our midst
as adults, and the opportunity to use our best efforts to rehabilitate, guide and
care for them will have been lost.-
Butler, 324 Ark. at 487, 922 S.W.2d at 692 (Roaf, J., dissenting).
165. In Kent v. United States, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that a juvenile
transfer hearing is a "critically important" proceeding. 383 U.S. at 556-57. It means the
difference between treatment and potentially a long period of incarceration or even the death
penalty. See id.
166. See Cantrell, 256 Ark. 784, 510 S.W.2d 546.
167. See 1911 Ark. Acts215, § 10.
168. See id.
169. 256 Ark. 784, 510 S.W.2d 546 (1974).
170. Id. at 786, 510 S.W.2d at 548 (citing with approval Pritchard v. Downie, 216 F. Supp.
621 (E.D. Ark. 1963) aff'd, 326 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1964)). The majority opinion was criticized
by Justices Fogelman and Brown in their dissent. The dissent concludes:
The language of the act as to the minor who may be arrested without a warrant
is clearly mandatory.... A reading of this section (and other statutes) evinces
a clear legislative intention that a court acting through a judicial officer, not an
arresting officer, make the determination, in the exercise ofjudicial discretion,
whether a youthful law violator should be prosecuted in the criminal courts as
an adult would be....
Id. at 792, 510 S.W.2d at 551.
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Despite changes to the Code, the Arkansas Supreme Court continued to
grant prosecutors the authority to decide which children should be tried as
adults with little court review.1 7' The Arkansas Supreme Court has concluded
that the charging document alone is enough to justify keeping a child in adult
court, 17 even though the statutory language clearly contemplates independent
judicial review. 173 The Court's deference to the prosecutor in these cases
ignores the statutory obligation for a hearing.' 174
2. The Arkansas Supreme Court Minimizes the Trial Judges' Responsi-
bilities
Although the Code clearly mandates that the trial judges review all three
factors, 175 the Arkansas Supreme Court has continually permitted the trial
judges to consider the charge alone as a legally sufficient basis to keep a child
in adult court. 76  Recognizing the need for discretion in these difficult
171. See Boyce, supra note 55, at 1001-02. See also Miller v. State, 328 Ark. 121, 942
S.W.2d 825 (1997); Davis, 319 Ark. at 613, 893 S.W.2d at 768; Walker, 304 Ark. at 393, 803
S.W.2d at 502; Hallman v. State, 288 Ark. 448, 452, 706 S.W.2d 381, 383 (1986). Even
though prosecutors are technically given this authority, it appeared as late as 1989 that police
officers continued to make the decision regarding in which court to charge a child. See
ARKANSAS COMM'N ON JUV. JUST., JUVENILE COURTS IN ARKANSAS at 30 (1989).
172. Following the writing of this article but shortly before it was printed, the Arkansas
Supreme Court reversed its holding on this issue. The court concluded that "there must be some
evidence to substantiate the serious and violent nature of the charges contained in the
information." Thompson v. State, No. 97-339, slip op. at 6 (Dec. 11, 1997). See Miller, 328
Ark. at 130-31, 942 S.W.2d at 830-31; Sanders, 326 Ark. at 415, 932 S.W.2d at 315; Walker,
304 Ark. at 399, 803 S.W.2d at 506. Although the court in Walker states that not all criminal
informations will qualify as sufficient evidence, see Walker, 304 Ark. at 402-D, 805 S.W. 2d
at 82, the court has never overturned a finding based on an information. See, e.g., Butler, 324
Ark. at 476, 922 S.W.2d at 685; Davis, 319 Ark. at 613, 893 S.W.2d at 768; Bell, 317 Ark. at
289, 877 S.W.2d at 579; Bradley v. State, 306 Ark. 621, 816 S.W.2d 605 (1991).
173. See Walker, 304 Ark. at 402, 803 S.W.2d at 508 (Newbern, Dudley & Corbin, JJ.,
dissenting) ("If the Arkansas General Assembly had intended that the court have the power to
try a juvenile as an adult any time a serious offense involving violence was alleged, it would
have said so."). But see Pennington v. State, 305 Ark. 312, 807 S.W.2d 660 (1991); Banks, 306
Ark. at 273, 813 S.W.2d at 256. See, e.g., Hallman, 288 Ark. at 452, 706 S.W.2d at 383 ("The
trial court stated that the Prosecuting Attorney had used sound judgment and denied the motion
based on the factors discussed by the Prosecutor." From the opinion, it does not appear there
was any testimony. There was only a justification for the charge stated by the prosecutor.).
174. The court seemed to suggest that there was no need for an evidentiary hearing in Ring
when it stated "the challenged testimony was wholly unnecessary given the sufficiency of the
felony information." Ring, 320 Ark. 128, 133, 894 S.W.2d 944, 947 (1995).
175. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(e) (Michie Supp. 1995). See also Booker, 324 Ark.
at 474, 922 S.W.2d at 340; Walker, 304 Ark. at 393, 803 S.W.2d at 502.
176. See, e.g., Carroll, 326 Ark. at 882, 934 S.W.2d at 524-25; Sanders, 326 Ark. at 415,
932 S.W.2d at 315; Butler, 324 Ark. at 484, 922 S.W.2d at 690; Cole, 323 Ark. at 136, 913
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decisions, the court has reasonably concluded that equal weight need not be
given to each factor. 77 However, this balancing does not obviate the need to
consider all the factors as mandated by the legislature.'78
Furthermore, the court's decision can be made without the presentation of
any evidence.179 The court can base its ruling on the prosecutor's statements
S.W.2d at 779; Ring, 320 Ark. at 128, 894 S.W.2d at 944; Davis, 319 Ark. at 613, 893 S.W.2d
at 768.
The court relies on its findings in Ashing v. State as its precedent for this conclusion.
See Ashing, 288 Ark. 75, 702 S.W.2d 20 (1986). In Ashing, the Arkansas Supreme Court
concluded that "[t]he seriousness and violence of this crime might alone be sufficient to sustain
the refusal to transfer to juvenile court... ." Id. at 79, 702 S.W.2d at 21. Ashing, however, is
based on the previous code. Under the 1981 version of the Code used in Ashing, there was not
the operative word "and" between the factors as there is today. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-
318(e) (Michie Supp. 1995). Furthermore, the 1981 Code limited the trial court's authority to
review factors. ARK. CODE ANN. § 45-420 (Michie Supp. 1983) states that "the court shall
consider only the following factors." Whereas, the modem code states "the court shall consider
the following factors." ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(e) (Michie Supp. 1995). These
distinctions make the application of Ashing to the modem code inappropriate. However, the
court continues to apply Ashing.
177. See, e.g., Ring, 320 Ark. at 128, 894 S.W.2d at 944; Ashing, 288 Ark. at 77, 702
S.W.2d at 21; Walker, 304 Ark. at 400, 803 S.W.2d at 506.
178. See Smith v. State, 307 Ark. 223, 228, 818 S.W.2d 945, 947 (1991) (the court appears
to rely exclusively on the prior adjudications factor. There is no evidence that the other two
factors were considered.). See Bright, 307 Ark. 250, 819 S.W.2d 7 (the court appears to rely
exclusively on the second factor.). See Wicker, 310 Ark. 580, 839 S.W.2d 186 (the court
appears to rely exclusively on the serious and violent nature of the offense). See Holland v.
State, 311 Ark. 494, 844 S.W.2d 943 (1993) (although the only evidence apparently presented
was on the child's likelihood for rehabilitation, the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's denial of request for a transfer to juvenile court even though the trial court provided no
reasons for its ruling).
In Ashing, the trial judge did not appear to consider the potential for rehabilitation or the
character of the children involved. See Ashing, 288 Ark. 75, 702 S.W.2d 20. "[A] charge of
first degree murder as indicated by the facts in this case is not one that should be dealt with by
the Juvenile court." Id. at 79, 702 S.W.2d at 22. This was under the old statute under which it
could be argued that the judge was not obligated to consider all three factors. See supra note
174.
Although there may not be evidence to be presented on each factor, that does not mean
the court should not consider each factor. See Walker, 304 Ark. at 400, 803 S.W.2d at 506.
179. In Walker, the Court takes a novel view that the criminal information is "evidence."
Walker, 304 Ark. at 399, 803 S.W.2d at 506. See also Bell, 317 Ark. at 292, 877 S.W.2d at
581.
However, there are cases in which it appears from the facts presented in the appellate
decision that a full evidentiary hearing was presented. See Jones, 326 Ark. at 684, 933 S.W.2d
at 389 (two police officers, the aunt of the defendant, a teacher and counselor testified); Kindle,
326 Ark. 282, 931 S.W.2d 117 (psychiatrist, three school officials, the grandparents of the
defendant and the victim testified); McClure, 328 Ark. 35, 942 S.W.2d 243 (a probation officer,
criminal investigator, the defendant, his mother and a church youth program director testified);
Humphrey v. State, 327 Ark. 753, 940 S.W.2d 860 (1997) (The surviving victim testified);
Carroll, 326 Ark. 882, 934 S.W.2d 523 (two police officers, a psychologist and the child's
guardian testified); Booker, 324 Ark. 468, 922 S.W.2d 337 (two police officers, the child and
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alone18 or merely on the charging document. 8  This practice is shocking
because the burden of proof in transfer cases is "clear and convincing evidence
that a juvenile should be tried as an adult." '82 Although the rules of evidence
apply to these proceedings, the judges regularly allow inadmissible evidence." 3
both parents testified); Butler, 324 Ark. 476, 922 S.W.2d 685 (a police officer and both parents
testified); McGaughy, 321 Ark. 537, 906 S.W.2d 671 (numerous witnesses testified); Johnson,
317 Ark. 521, 878 S.W.2d 758 (two family members, the child, a juvenile probation officer, and
the investigating detective testified); Beck v. State, 317 Ark. 154, 876 S.W.2d 561 (1994);
Cobbins v. State, 306 Ark. 447, 816 S.W.2d 161 (1991) (victim testified about the acts
committed by the defendant, a juvenile officer testified about prior failed attempts at
rehabilitation, and a University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences report provided information
about the child's character).
180. See Sanders, 326 Ark. 415, 932 S.W.2d 315; Hallman, 288 Ark. at 452, 706 S.W.2d
at 383; Walker, 304 Ark. 393, 803 S.W.2d 502.
The only recognition that statements by counsel are not evidence involved the exclusion
of a defense counsel's statement regarding the lack of prior offenses. See Johnson v. State, 307
Ark. 525, 535, 823 S.W.2d 440, 445 (1992).
181. Following the writing of this article but shortly before it was printed, the Arkansas
Supreme Court reversed its holding on this issue. The court concluded that "there must be some
evidence to substantiate the serious and violent nature of the charges contained in the
information." Thompson v. State, No. 97-339, slip op. at 6 (Dec. 11, 1997). See Walker, 304
Ark.at 399, 803 S.W.2d at 506. Although this opinion allowed the judge to consider the
criminal information as evidence, subsequent opinions have given trial judges authority to give
the information "substantial weight." See Williams v. State, 313 Ark. 451, 455, 856 S.W.2d
4, 6 (1993). See also Humphrey, 327 Ark. at 768, 940 S.W.2d at 868; Hamilton, 320 Ark. 346,
896 S.W.2d 877 (seeming to exclude consideration of police testimony to avoid addressing an
evidentiary objection); Davis, 319 Ark. 613, 893 S.W.2d 768; Bell, 317 Ark. at 292, 877
S.W.2d at 581.
There is one case in which the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed a trial court for relying
solely on the prosecutor's statements. In Pennington, three children were charged with criminal
mischief for damaging tombstones. 305 Ark. 312, 807 S.W.2d 660. In its ruling, the trial judge
admitted, "I'm not going to substitute my judgment in this case for that of the prosecutor. If
he wants to proceed with felony charges against these three, well, he certainly may do so." Id.
at 315, 807 S.W.2d at 662.
182. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(f) (Michie Supp. 1995). See also Walker, 304 Ark. at
401-02, 803 S.W.2d at 507 (Newbern, Dudley, & Corbin, JJ., dissenting).
"Clear and convincing evidence is evidence of a degree that produces in the trier of fact
a firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be established." Guy v. State, 323 Ark. 649, 653,
916 S.W.2d 760, 762 (1996).
183. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-325(e) (Michie Supp. 1995) states that the Rules of Evidence
shall apply to proceedings under the Arkansas Juvenile Code. However, this issue has not been
resolved by the Arkansas Supreme Court. In a concurrence, Justices Brown and Imber express
their clear belief that the Rules of Evidence do apply. See McClure, 328 Ark. at 45-46, 942
S.W.2d at 248-49 (1997) (Brown & Imber, J.J., concurring). The majority has avoided
addressing the issue directly. In McClure, the court found that there was no prejudice caused
by the admission of inadmissible documentary evidence when the contents of the evidence was
properly presented through another witness in addition to the questionable documents. See
McClure, 328 Ark. at 42-43, 942 S.W.2d at 247. In Hamilton and Davis, the court avoided
addressing the issue because it found the court's transfer reasonable based on the criminal
information of rape alone. See Hamilton, 320 Ark. 346, 896 S.W.2d 877 (1995); Davis, 319
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It does not seem justifiable to permit such a critical stage of the case to proceed
in such a lax manner.84
In Pennington v. State,185 one of the few cases in which the Arkansas
Supreme Court reversed a circuit court's decision to retain jurisdiction over a
juvenile, the Arkansas Supreme Court provides the proper rule for the trial
judges:
[T]he purpose of the Arkansas Juvenile Code... recognizes the need for
careful, case-by-case evaluation when juveniles are charged with criminal
offenses. Section 9-27-318 clearly delegates the responsibility for
determining which court is most appropriate to the court in which the
charges were brought, and the abdication of this responsibility to the
prosecutor, in this case, was an abuse of the court's discretion. 86
Although this "careful, case-by-case evaluation" is the standard by which trial
courts should abide, this standard has been applied only once by the Arkansas
Supreme Court when evaluating trial judges' conduct in juvenile transfer
hearings." 7
3. The Courts Minimize Appellate Review
Arkansas law allows for an interlocutory appeal of a trial court's transfer
decision.' 8 Any appeal of this decision must be done interlocutorily.'89 This
Ark. 613, 893 S.W.2d 768 (1995); see also Sanders, 326 Ark. at 421, 932 S.W.2d at 318-19.
Although the trial judges appear to permit a great deal of inadmissible evidence into the
record, few objections by defense counsel are referenced in the case law. Without objections,
the Arkansas Supreme Court cannot review the error. See Sanders, 326 Ark. at 421, 932
S.W.2d at 318-19.
184. See, e.g., Smith, 307 Ark. 223,818 S.W.2d 945 (finding no prejudice from giving the
defense only a three-day notice on a transfer hearing). It was precisely this type of lax manner
that was condemned by the Supreme Court in Kent. See Kent, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966). As
the Court in Kent explained, "[i]t is inconceivable that a court of justice dealing with adults,
with respect to a similar issue, would proceed in this manner." Id. In Kent, they were dealing
with proceedings much worse than many of the proceedings described in the Arkansas appellate
decision, but Kent makes it clear that these are "critically important" proceedings that need to
be taken seriously. See id. at 556-57.
185. 305 Ark. 312, 807 S.W.2d 660 (1991). This case involved two seventeen year-old
children charged with criminal mischief for damaging tombstones in a cemetery. See id.
186. Pennington, 305 Ark. at 315, 807 S.W.2d 662.
187. See Banks, 306 Ark. at 282, 813 S.W.2d at 261. In Holland, the trial court denied the
motion without stating any reasons, and the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the denial of a
transfer. See Holland, 311 Ark. 494, 844 S.W.2d 943.
188. Rule I-2(a)(I 1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court allows "interlocutory appeals
permitted by statute," and ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(h) (Michie Supp. 1995) states that
"[a]ny party may appeal from an order granting or denying the transfer of a case from one court
to another court having jurisdiction over the matter." See also McClure, 328 Ark. at 37, 942
S.W.2d at 244; Booker, 324 Ark. at 470, 922 S.W.2d at 338; Guy, 323 Ark. at 651, 916 S.W.2d
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procedure is not uncommon.' 90 It allows for the resolution of this issue before
there has been an expensive jury trial and can spare the child the burden and
public scrutiny of a criminal trial. 9 ' However, this procedure causes
tremendous delay in the proceedings especially when appeals in these matters
are not generally expedited. 92 The delay hurts the child as much as the
system.' 93
Whereas Kent v. United States'9' calls for meaningful appellate review of
this important judicial proceeding,"5 Arkansas appellate courts have deferred
to trial court conclusions even without any findings.'9 Under an older version
of the statute, the court applied an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing
trial courts' decisions regarding transfers of children to adult courts.' 97 After
at 761; McGaughy, 321 Ark. at 538, 906 S.W.2d at 672; Ring, 320 Ark. at 130, 894 S.W.2d at
945; Sebastian, 318 Ark. at 495, 885 S.W.2d at 883; Beck, 317 Ark. at 158, 876 S.W.2d at 563.
189. See Hamilton, 320 Ark. at 346, 896 S.W.2d at 877.
190. See, e.g., United States v. A.D.J., 108 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 1997). See also 2 KRAMER,
supra note 1, § 22.20.
191. See Hamilton, 320 Ark. at 348-49, 896 S.W.2d at 879 (adopting the latter rationale
from State v. Harwood, 572 P.2d 1228 (Idaho 1977)).
192. There was an effort to expedite the trial court review of this procedure. In 1989, the
legislature mandated a hearing to resolve the transfer issue within ninety days of a charge being
filed in circuit court against fourteen or fifteen year-old child in circuit court. See 1989 Ark.
Acts 273, § 17(b)(2). However, this time line was not enforced by the appellate courts, which
were not willing to mandate the loss of circuit court jurisdiction due to the expiration of the
ninety day deadline. See Cobbins v. State, 306 Ark. 447, 816 S.W.2d 161 (1991) (ruling that
the failure to meet the ninety day hearing deadline is not jurisdictional). So, this time line was
deleted from the code in 1994. See 1994 Ark. Acts 40.
193. The delays in appeals seem to strengthen the case against the child who is
disadvantaged because the Arkansas Supreme Court has concluded that a child over eighteen
at the time of appeal should remain in adult court regardless of his age at the time of the
incident. See McClure, 328 Ark. at 35, 942 S.W.2d at 243; Carroll, 326 Ark. at 886, 943
S.W.2d at 525 ; Sims, 320 Ark. at 536-37, 900 S.W.2d at 513; Wicker, 310 Ark. at 580, 839
S.W.2d at 186. These decisions also seem to be in conflict with Kent. See Kent, 383 U.S. 541.
In Kent, the Supreme Court reversed the case even though the child had reached twenty-one and
was thus beyond the jurisdiction ofjuvenile court. See id. at 564-65.
194. 383 U.S. 541 (1996).
195. In Kent, the court explains:
Meaningful review requires that the reviewing court should review. It should not
be remitted to assumptions. It must have before it a statement of the reasons
motivating the waiver including, of course, a statement of the relevant facts. It may
not 'assume' that there are adequate reasons, nor may it merely assume that 'full
investigation' has been made. Accordingly, we hold that it is incumbent upon the
Juvenile Court to accompany its waiver order with a statement of the reasons or
considerations therefor ....
Id. at 561.
196. See, e.g., Smith, 328 Ark. at 737-39, 946 S.W.2d at 668-69 (1997) (affirming a one
sentence order denying the request to transfer the case to juvenile court); Bell, 317 Ark. at 292-
93, 877 S.W.2d at 581. One Justice made it clear that he believed transfer decisions are "best
left to the trial judges." Blevins, 308 Ark. at 619, 826 S.W.2d at 268 (Brown, J., dissenting).
197. See Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859, 884, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (1977); Franklin v. State,
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changes were made to the statute in 1989, the court modified its standard of
review to a clearly erroneous standard.' 98 However, the seriousness with which
the court takes this review is questionable. As the dissent in one case explains:
While our job is not to determine on appeal whether there was clear and
convincing evidence or whether the trial court abused its discretion we
must decide whether the trial court clearly erred in making the determina-
tion. If the determination was not clearly erroneous when all the evidence
but for the charge was on the side of trying the juvenile as a juvenile, then
how could we ever hold a decision that a juvenile, charged in Circuit
Court, should be tried as such is clearly erroneous? If we can never make
such a decision, then why did the General Assembly not simply require
that any juvenile charged with a serious offense be tried as an adult?"9
Often the trial court provides only general statements explaining its
decision2°° or provides no explanation at all.2 ' This leaves the appellate courts
7 Ark. App. 75, 76, 644 S.W.2d 318 (1983).
198. Clearly erroneous is defined as "whether the trial judge's finding is clearly against the
preponderance of the evidence." Smith, 307 Ark. at 227, 818 S.W.2d at 948; Cobbins, 306 Ark.
at 447, 816 S.W.2d at 161; Walker, 304 Ark. at 402-D, 805 S.W.2d at 81. Although this is the
standard adopted in the Walker case based on changes made to the Juvenile Code in 1989, the
court erred in two cases and applied the old abuse of discretion standard in Pennington, 305
Ark. 312, 807 S.W.2d 660 and Banks, 306 Ark. at 282, 813 S.W.2d at 261. This error was
admitted and corrected in Bradley, 306 Ark. at 624, 816 S.W.2d at 607.
199. Walker, 304 Ark. at 402-03, 805 S.W.2d at 83-84 (Newbern, Dudley, & Corbin, JJ.,
dissenting). The court can give deference to the trial courts, but this does not mean that trial
courts should be given "a license for arbitrary procedure." Kent, 383 U.S. at 553.
200. In the court's most recent ruling on transfer it makes a shocking conclusion. Although
the court's order denying the request to transfer a case to juvenile court consists of one sentence
and the oral pronouncement discusses none of mandated statutory criteria required under ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(e), the court concluded that the trial court considered all the criteria
mandated. See Smith, 328 Ark. at 738, 946 S.W.2d at 669. See also Butler, 324 Ark. at 484,
922 S.W.2d at 689; Lammers, 324 Ark. at 225-26, 920 S.W.2d at 10; Green, 323 Ark. at 638,
916 S.W.2d at 758; Cole, 323 Ark. at 140-41, 913 S.W.2d at 781; Sims, 320 Ark. at 536, 900
S.W.2d at 512; Davis, 319 Ark. at 613, 893 S.W.2d at 768; Bell, 317 Ark. at 292, 877 S.W.2d
at 581; Vickers, 307 Ark. at 300, 819 S.W.2d at 14 (Although the court heard testimony on the
offense and the child's background, "the circuit court alluded to the seriousness and severity
of the offense charged and to the manner in which it was carried out .... He then denied the
motion."); Hallman, 288 Ark. at 452, 706 S.W.2d at 383 ("The trial court stated that the
Prosecuting Attorney had used sound judgment and denied the motion."); Ashing, 288 Ark. at
79, 702 S.W.2d at 21-22; Evans v. State, 287 Ark. 136, 143, 697 S.W.2d 879, 883 (1985) ("The
primary complaint of appellant is that the trial court failed to state the rationale for its decision
...."); Little, 261 Ark. at 884, 554 S.W.2d at 324 (no statement supporting the trial court's
conclusion to retain jurisdiction over the child, however, the court concludes that the trial court
must have had a basis because it had conducted a lengthy hearing on the voluntariness of the
child's confession).
However, some judges have provided detailed explanations for their findings. See
Holmes, 322 Ark. at 580, 911 S.W.2d at 259; Sebastian, 318 Ark. at 497, 885 S.W.2d at 884;
Beck, 317 Ark. at 165, 876 S.W.2d at 567; Williams, 313 Ark. at 451, 856 S.W.2d at 4;
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with the task of guessing the basis for the ruling.20 2 If the Arkansas Supreme
Court wanted to have meaningful review of these decisions, it could mandate
specific findings by the trial judges.20 3 The Court has recommended such
procedures but has failed to enforce its recommendations with a mandate.20"
Such a mandate may already exist under the Constitutional obligation of due
Franklin, 7 Ark. App. at 75, 644 S.W.2d at 318.
201. See Booker, 324 Ark. at 473, 922 S.W.2d at 339; Holland, 311 Ark. at 494, 844
S.W.2d at 943.
202. The guessing of the court is highlighted by the following statement in Guy: "It is not
apparent that the trial court failed to consider the remaining statutory factors." Guy, 323 Ark.
at 654, 916 S.W.2d at 763. See also Butler, 324 Ark. at 483, 922 S.W.2d at 689-90 ("[I]t
appears that the circuit court took into consideration all the testimony and evidence presented
.... ") (emphasis added). This type of guessing was precisely what the Supreme Court
condemned in Kent. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 561. There is a statutory presumption that a child
should be in juvenile court, and the burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence. Without
specific findings, it does not seem that the appellate court should give the trial courts as much
deference as the appellate courts have been inclined to give in these cases.
203. Findings of fact seem especially necessary in these transfer cases because the standard
of review for the appellate court is clearly erroneous findings of fact. See Smith, 307 Ark. at
227, 818 S.W.2d at 947.
204. See Evans, 287 Ark. at 143, 697 S.W.2d at 883 ("Although it would be preferable for
a trial judge to state the reasons for his decision, there is no statutory requirement that he do
so."). See also Lammers, 324 Ark. at 225-26, 920 S.W.2d at 10; Bell, 317 Ark. at 293, 877
S.W.2d at 581; Williams, 313 Ark. at 454, 856 S.W.2d at 6; Walker, 304 Ark. at 400, 803
S.W.2d at 507.
The Arkansas Supreme Court is correct that the Arkansas statute does not mandate a
specific statement of facts. Some state legislatures have chosen to require courts to make
factual findings. Even without this statutory requirement, the Court could mandate such
findings as the Supreme Court did in Kent. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 561.
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process as interpreted in Kent.2" 5 However, this holding has not been applied
to Arkansas cases.
206
The Arkansas Supreme Court has further limited its review by creating a
standard that views the evidence in a light most favorable to the state."' In
transfer hearings, there is a statutory presumption that a child should be in
juvenile court, and the burden is clear and convincing evidence. 2 ' Therefore,
it would appear more appropriate for the courts to view the evidence in a light
most favorable to the child.
4. The Court Interprets Statutory Language to Keep Children in Adult
Court
Although the Juvenile Code mandates liberal construction so its purposes
of rehabilitation rather than retributive punishment may be carried out,209 the
205. See KRAMER, supra note 1, § 22.20. Although there was some confusion about
whether the Kent decision involved statutory construction or constitutional interpretation, the
Supreme Court made it clear that Kent involved a constitutional interpretation of transfer
proceedings in Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 537 (1975) (The Court ruled that a transfer
hearing after an adjudication would violate the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy). See also T.J.H. v. Bills, 504 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Mo. 1974); Lujan v. District Court, 505
P.2d 896, 900 (Mont. 1973); Edwards v. State, 591 P.2d 313, 319-320 (Okla. Crim. App.
1979); Pollard v. Riddle, 482 F. Supp. 260, 262 (E.D. Va. 1979); In the matter of Three Minors,
684 P.2d 1121, 1123 (Nev. 1984); Commonwealth v. Deppella, 460 A.2d 1184, 1186-1187 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1983); Crick v. Smith, 650 F.2d 860, 863-864 (6th Cir. 1981); Hubbs v.
Commonwealth, 511 S.W.2d 664 (Ky. 1974); Michael Vitiello, Constitutional Safeguards For
Juvenile Transfer Procedure: The Ten Years Since Kent v. United States, 26 DEPAUL L. REV.
23 (1976). However, some courts have held that all the mandates of Kent are not necessarily
constitutional mandates. See People v. Taylor, 391 N.E.2d 366 (11. 1979).
The Arkansas Courts have not directly addressed the question of whether
Kent's mandates are constitutional. In Ashing, the court references an Illinois case, People v.
Taylor. See Ashing, 288 Ark. at 78, 702 S.W.2d at 21. The Illinois case holds that Kent is a
case involving constitutional mandates. Thus, one could argue that the court has accepted the
principle that Kent is a constitutional case. See also Banks, 217 Ark. at 333, 609 S.W.2d at 12.
(concluding that Kent did not interpret the constitution to require a judicial hearing prior to a
prosecutor filing adult charges).
206. The Arkansas courts have not directly addressed the applicability of any of Kent's
mandates. See supra note 203. The specific issue of Kent's mandate for specific factual
findings was raised in Butler, 324 Ark. 476, 922 S.W.2d 685. However, the court did not rule
on the issue because it had not been raised in the trial court and thus could not be reviewed on
appeal. See Butler, 324 Ark. at 485, 922 S.W.2d at 691.
207. See McClure, 328 Ark. at 35, 942 S.W.2d at 245; Kindle, 326 Ark. at 284, 931 S.W.2d
at 118; Wicker, 310 Ark. at 580, 839 S.W.2d at 186.
208. See ARK. CODE ANN. §9-27-318(f) (Michie Supp. 1995). Other states' courts have
recognized this presumption in favor of the child based on legislative purposes clauses very
similar to Arkansas's. See, e.g., Atkins v. State, 290 N.E.2d 441, 443 (Ind. 1972), superseded
by statute, Gregory v. State, 386 N.E.2d 675 (Ind. 1979).
209. The Arkansas Juvenile Code states:
This subchapter shall be liberally construed to the end that its purposes may be
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Arkansas Supreme Court has historically gone to great lengths to interpret
statutory language in a manner which keeps children under the jurisdiction of
adult courts.2" ° This rewriting of legislation is extraordinary although not
unprecedented."' It is a basic tenet of statutory construction that the court is
obligated to give terms their ordinary meaning. 2 Properly applied, the Code
requires the trial court to show evidence of balancing the factors, requires the
State to prove actual violence committed by the child if violence was the factor
carried out:
(1) To assure that all juveniles brought to the attention of the courts receive the
guidance, care, and control, preferably in each juvenile's own home, which will best
serve the emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the juvenile and the best
interests of the state;
(2) To preserve and strengthen the juveniles' family ties whenever possible,
removing him from the custody of his parents only when his welfare or the safety
and protection of the public cannot adequately be safeguarded without such
removal; and, when the juvenile is removed from his own family, to secure for him
custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should
have been given by his parents; and to assure, in all cases in which a juvenile must
be permanently removed from the custody of his parents, that the juvenile be placed
in an approved family home and be made a member of the family by adoption;
(3) To protect society more effectively by substituting for retributive punishment,
whenever possible, methods of offender rehabilitation and rehabilitative restitution,
recognizing that the application of sanctions which are consistent with the
seriousness of the offense is appropriate in all cases;
(4) To provide means through which the provisions of this subchapter are executed
and enforced and in which the parties are assured a fair hearing and their
constitutional and other legal rights recognized and enforced.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-302 (Michie 1993) (emphasis added).
210. Under the former Juvenile Code, the court ignored operative phrases in an effort to
permit direct filing of children arrested without a warrant. See Cantrell, 256 Ark. at 788-89,
510 S.W.2d at 549 (Fogleman, J., dissenting). The court later concluded that the legislature's
use of the phrase "over the age of fifteen" must have been inadvertent and concluded that the
legislature really meant to say "fifteen or over." See Banks, 271 Ark. at 331, 609 S.W.2d at 11.
The court also concluded that the legislature didn't mean to say that a fourteen-year-old child
must have "committed" the offense of murder or rape to qualify for adult court. According to
the court, the legislature meant that child merely needed to be accused of murder or rape to
qualify for adult court. See Ashing, 288 Ark. at 79-80, 702 S.W.2d at 22, superseded by statute,
Walker v. State, 304 Ark. 393, 805 S.W.2d 80 (1991). The court permits the charge alone to
be sufficient to keep a child in adult court. See Walker, 304 Ark. at 402, 803 S.W.2d at 508
(Newbem, Dudley & Corbin, JJ., dissenting) ("If the Arkansas General Assembly had intended
that the court have the power to try a juvenile as an adult anytime a serious offense involving
violence was alleged, it would have said so.").
211. See, e.g., Rosario v. State, 319 Ark. 764, 894 S.W.2d 888 (1995) (adding the offense
of possession of handgun by a juvenile to juvenile court jurisdiction while admitting it is
redrafting the Code.).
212. See Mountain Home Sch. Dist. V. T.M.J. Builders, Inc., 313 Ark. 661, 664, 858
S.W.2d 74, 76 (1993).
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relied upon,213 and requires prior criminal activity to involve adjudicated
offenses rather than just charges.214
One of the more egregious additions created by the court has been the
additional grounds that a child is too close to or over his eighteenth birthday to
allow juvenile court jurisdiction.215 Although the factors to be used by the trial
courts in reviewing transfer request have remained identical since 198 1216 and
213. In Johnson, the court changed the Juvenile Code's violence factor, which requires
consideration of "[tihe seriousness of the offense, and whether violence was employed by the
juvenile in the commission of the offense," ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(e)(1) (Michie Supp.
1995), to require consideration of only "[t]he seriousness of the offense and whether it [i.e. the
offense] involved violence." See Johnson, 317 Ark. at 523, 878 S.W.2d at 759. See also Bell,
317 Ark. 289, 877 S.W.2d 579 (even though the child didn't commit the violence, violence
counted against the child because it was a violent offense.).
This loose interpretation permits the mere accusation of a violent offense to be enough
to keep a child in adult court and thereby leads to a convoluted reading of precedent. See
Green, 323 Ark. at 641-42, 916 S.W.2d at 759-60 (Glaze, Jesson, & Corbin, JJ., dissenting).
In Green, a fourteen year-old boy with no priors but some history of brandishing firearms killed
a thirteen year-old friend. See Green, 323 Ark. at 637-38, 916 S.W.2d at 757-58. The friend
died from a gunshot wound. There was some discrepancy about whether the shooting was an
accident, but the defendant testified that it was an accident. See id. at 637, 916 S.W.2d at 757.
To avoid overturning precedent, the court concluded that to kill someone recklessly with a
firearm does not necessarily mean that violence was employed. See id. at 639-41, 916 S.W.2d
at 758-59.
214. But see Bright, 307 Ark. 250, 819 S.W.2d 7. The child's record in Bright was not
clear. He "previously had been charged in juvenile court, and previously had been placed on
probation by the juvenile court." Id. at 251, 819 S.W.2d at 8.
215. See Jensen, 328 Ark. 349,944 S.W.2d 820; McClure, 328 Ark. 35, 942 S.W.2d 243;
Carroll, 326 Ark. at 886, 934 S.W.2d at 525; Jones, 326 Ark. at 684, 933 S.W.2d at 389;
Maddox, 326 Ark. at 520, 931 S.W.2d at 441; Sanders, 326 Ark. at 422, 932 S.W.2d at 319;
Brooks, 326 Ark. at 204-05, 929 S.W.2d at 162; Macon, 323 Ark. at 500, 915 S.W.2d at 274;
Hansen, 323 Ark. at 407,914 S.W.2d at 739; McGaughy, 321 Ark. at 539, 906 S.W.2d at 673;
Myers, 317 Ark. at 71-72, 876 S.W.2d at 247-48; Wicker, 310 Ark. at 581, 839 S.W.2d at 187;
Bright, 307 Ark. at 252, 819 S.W.2d at 8. Even if the child wasn't near his eighteenth birthday
at the time of the offense but the delay of the appeal has caused him to be close to or over his
eighteenth birthday by the time the supreme court hears the matter, it counts against the child.
See McClure, 328 Ark. 35, 942 S.W.2d 243; Sims, 320 Ark. at 537, 900 S.W.2d at 513.
In Guy v. State, the fact that the child was only sixteen at the time of the hearing would
count in his favor according to three concurring justices. See Guy, 323 Ark. at 655, 916 S.W.2d
at 763.
216. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-420 (1981) is almost identical to ARK. CODE ANN. 9-27-318(e)
(Michie Supp. 1995). Both state the factors a trial judge must consider when reviewing a
transfer motion:
(a) The seriousness of the offense and whether violence was employed by the
juvenile in the commission of the offense.
(b) Whether the offense is part of a repetitive pattern of adjudicated offenses which
would lead to the determination that the juvenile is beyond rehabilitation under
existing rehabilitation programs, as evidenced by past efforts to treat and rehabilitate
the juvenile and the response to such efforts.
(c) The prior history, character traits and mental maturity, and any other factors
which reflect on the juvenile's prospects for rehabilitation.
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none of them permit the court to consider the age of the child, the court has
added a clause permitting courts to deny a transfer because the child is too
close to or over his eighteenth birthday.217 In a recent decision, the Arkansas
Supreme Court concluded that this "can be a critical factor"even though it is
not mentioned in the statute.21 8
5. The Child's Burden of Proof
Although the Code presumes the child should be processed in juvenile
court, t9 the courts have required the child to prove that he or she should be
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-420 (1981)
The only additions in the 1995 version are semicolons after sections a and b, an "and"
after section b, deleting the "s" in the word factor in subsection c, and renumbering the
subsections with numbers rather than letters. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(e) (Michie Supp.
1995). Although these changes are significant, they do not change the factors to be considered.
217. In Evans v. State, the court concluded the fact that the child could only be given a
disposition of probation by a juvenile court because he had turned eighteen is a legitimate
consideration in concluding that rehabilitation would not work. See Evans, 287 Ark. at 143,
697 S.W.2d at 883. See also Smith v. State, No. 96-1180, 1997 WL 316720 (Ark. June 2,
1997); Hansen, 323 Ark. at 410-11, 914 S.W.2d at 739; Myers, 317 Ark. at 71-72, 876 S.W.2d
at 247-48; Wicker, 310 Ark. 580, 839 S.W.2d 186.
It appears the court has a misunderstanding of the powers of juvenile court. In Bright,
the court concludes that because the child can't be committed to a youth services center there
are no rehabilitative options available to the juvenile court. See Bright, 307 Ark. 250, 819
S.W.2d 7; See also Smith, 1997 WL 316720; Myers, 317 Ark. at 71-72, 876 S.W.2d at 247-48;
Wicker, 310 Ark. 580, 839 S.W.2d 186. However, juvenile probation, with its many options
for services, is often more rehabilitative than commitment to the Division of Youth Services.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-330(a) (Michie Supp. 1995). Probation can include attendance of
a rehabilitation program as a condition of probation. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-331(c)
(Michie Supp. 1995). These programs can be inpatient or outpatient. Furthermore, probation
can be maintained until a child reaches the age of twenty-one. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-
303(l)(B) (Michie Supp. 1995). Juvenile court also has authority to commit a child to the
Division of Youth Services for a period of time beyond the child's eighteenth birthday if "the
Department of Human Services' State Institutional System Board determines that an adequate
facility or facilities are available for youths eighteen (18) years of age or older." ARK. CODE
ANN. 9-28-208(c)-(d) (Michie Supp. 1995). However, the commitment must occur before the
child's eighteenth birthday. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-28-206 (Michie Supp. 1995); Hansen,
323 Ark. at411 , 914 S.W.2d at 739. The Department of Human Services has not had to make
a determination of its facilities or provide adequate facilities for children close to their
eighteenth birthday because the courts have concluded that seventeen and eighteen-year-olds
are not rehabilitatable.
Other states have recognized the fallacy of the statement that there are no options to
juvenile courts other than commitment. See, e.g., Atkins, 290 N.E.2d at 444.
218. See Smith, 1997 WL 316720.
219. The Arkansas Code states: "Upon a finding by clear and convincing evidence that a
juvenile should be tried as an adult, the court shall enter an order to that effect." ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-27-318(f) (Michie Supp. 1995). This requires proof that a child should be tried as an
adult. It does not require proof that a child should be sent to juvenile court. The presumption
is that the child should be in juvenile court. Clear and convincing evidence is required to keep
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transferred if he or she is the movant.2 ° Because prosecutors are granted broad
discretion to file charges in adult court, most transfer decisions in Arkansas
occur in circuit court.22 Thus, the child, as defendant, is often moving for
transfer to juvenile court. Because the child is the movant, the Supreme Court
requires the child to prove his or her motion.222 By virtue of their broad
discretion in where to file the charges, the prosecutor can effectively decide
who should have the burden of proof, thereby negating any incentive for the
prosecutor to file in juvenile court.
In light of the statutory preference for juvenile court, a more logical
approach would be for a shifting burden similar to that required in Fourth
Amendment search or seizure hearings.223 Once the child establishes that he
a child in adult court. "Clear and convincing evidence" is "that degree of proof which will
produce in the trier of fact a firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be established." Kelly
v. Kelly, 264 Ark. 865, 870, 575 S.W.2d 672, 676 (1979). This would suggest that the state has
the burden if it wishes to keep a child in adult court. As the dissent in Walker makes clear: "If
the juvenile has moved to transfer the case to juvenile court, only one party will be offering
evidence 'that a juvenile should be tried as an adult,' and that is the state." Walker, 304 Ark.
at 402, 803 S.W.2d at 507 (Newbem, Dudley & Corbin, JJ., dissenting). See also Atkins, 290
N.E.2d at 443 (interpreting the Indiana Juvenile Code, which is similar to the Arkansas Code,
as imposing a clear presumption in favor of juvenile court jurisdiction).
220. See Walker, 304 Ark. at 398, 803 S.W.2d at 505, reh 'g denied, 304 Ark. 393, 805
S.W. 2d 80 (1991). See also Davis, 319 Ark. 613, 893 S.W.2d 768; Williams, 313 Ark. at 454,
856 S.W.2d at 6; Johnson v. State, 307 Ark. 525, 823 S.W.2d 440 (1992); Bradley, 306 Ark.
621, 816 S.W.2d 605.
To support this proposition in Walker, the court relied erroneously on the analysis in
Pennsylvania and Oklahoma cases. See Commonwealth v. Leatherbury, 568 A.2d 1313 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1990) and H.W. v. State, 759 P.2d 214 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988). As the dissent in
Walker points out, the Pennsylvania and Oklahoma statutes are dramatically different than the
Arkansas statute. See Walker, 304 Ark. at 402, 803 S.W.2d at 507 (Newbem, Dudley, &
Corbin, JJ., dissenting). In Pennsylvania, the statute specifically puts the burden on the child.
See Leatherbury, 568 A.2d at 1315. In Oklahoma, the statute required proof that the person
should be tried as a child which is the "mirror image" of the Code in Arkansas. See Walker, 304
Ark. at 402, 803 S.W.2d at 508 (Newbern, Dudley, & Corbin, JJ., dissenting).
221. Although there is no data on the actual number of transfer motions filed in juvenile
versus circuit courts, the appellate cases in this area provide some insight into the process. Out
of the sixty-eight appellate court opinions on transfers, only two have involved a motion to
transfer from juvenile to adult court. See Collins, 322 Ark. 161,908 S.W.2d 80; Smith, 307
Ark. 223, 818 S.W.2d 945.
222. It is not clear who would have the burden of proof if the motion to transfer were made
by the Court. The Arkansas Juvenile Code clearly permits motions of the court. See ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(d) (Michie Supp. 1995). Due to the statutory preference for juvenile
court, the court should conclude the burden rests with the State. See Walker, 304 Ark. at 402-E,
805 S.W.2d at 82 (Newbern, Dudley, & Corbin, JJ., dissenting).
223. In a warrantless search, the defense only needs to establish that there was a warrantless
search. Then the state has the burden of proof because the state seeks to use the evidence and
thus ought to bear the burden of establishing that it was lawfully come by in light of the desire
to protect the potentially infringed Constitutional rights of privacy. See I LAFAVE & ISRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 10.3(b) (1984). Likewise, the state desires to try a child as an adult
and should have to justify this in light of the statutory preference against this.
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or she is under eighteen, the burden should shift to the prosecution to establish
by clear and convincing evidence that the child should be tried as an adult.
22 4
Then, the child should be given an opportunity to rebut the prosecution's
evidence.
6. The Court's Message - Bad Kids Should Be in Adult Court
The logical conclusion from these decisions is that the Arkansas Supreme
Court wants children to be tried in adult court if they are charged with serious
offenses, and it will go to extraordinary means to prevent children from
avoiding adult punishment. As Justice Roaf so aptly stated in a dissent, "In
light of this court's previous holdings ... it seems to be open season on
juveniles, at least in the context of juvenile transfer hearings. 225
However, the court's obligation is to apply the law unless it violates the
constitution. There are problems in the juvenile justice system, but the Court
should be highlighting these problems by applying the law as written, not
circumventing the clear language of the statute to avoid the difficult questions.
VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE
A. Supreme Court Action
In Sanders v. State,226 the Arkansas Supreme Court provides an invitation
to review its holdings in transfer cases. The court stated:
This appears to be the logic of the court in Walker.
Appellant still has the burden of going forward with proof to show he meets the
criteria of the statute to warrant transfer. If he meets that burden, the transfer is
made. Under Act 273 he only fails if there is clear and convincing countervailing
evidence to support a finding that the juvenile should remain in circuit court.
Walker, 304 Ark. at 399, 803 S.W.2d at 506. This burden shifting seems to have been lost in
subsequent decisions.
224. The court would appear to require more than evidence of age. See Bradley, 306 Ark.
621, 816 S.W.2d 605 (holding that although the trial court was told the defendants' ages, it did
not shift the burden to the state to prove anything more than that they were charged with
aggravated assault); Johnson, 307 Ark. 525, 823 S.W.2d 440; Walker, 304 Ark. 393, 803
S.W.2d 502. However, requiring more than age would seem to defeat the clear intent of the
statute that the state has the burden. See id. at 401-02, 803 S.W.2d at 507 (Newbem, Dudley,
& Corbin, JJ., dissenting).
225. Hamilton, 320 Ark. at 352, 896 S.W.2d at 881 (Roaf, J., dissenting). In this same
case, Justice Newbem raises his objection to the tenor of these cases. These cases have
"allowed us to permit the trial courts, time and again, to sanction adult trials for children solely
on the basis of a charge of a violent crime." Id. at 351, 896 S.W.2d at 880.
226. 326 Ark. 415, 932 S.W.2d 315 (1996).
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For the above reasons we affirm the trial court's ruling denying the motion
to transfer. Even so, in our decisional conference, this case was a catalyst
for discussion on the need to review our past interpretation of parts of the
juvenile code. This case exemplifies the fact that, under our current
interpretations of the code, prosecuting attorneys can file a serious charge
against a juvenile in circuit court and do nothing more. It may be that there
is no substantial evidence to support the charge, and a transfer may be
denied.... This type of proceeding was not envisioned by the drafters of
the juvenile code, and we did not intend for our interpretations to do away
with the need for a meaningful hearing. As a result, we issue a caveat that
in juvenile transfer cases tried after this date, we will consider anew our
interpretation of the juvenile code when the issues are fully developed and
briefed.227
The attorneys and the court should take this opportunity to scrutinize the
wisdom and logic of the court's precedent and reverse some of its precedent
that neither meets the purposes of the code nor the language of the statute.
1. Fulfill the Purposes of the Arkansas Juvenile Code
The Arkansas Supreme Court should review its precedent and reverse
those opinions that conflict with the stated purposes of juvenile court "by
substituting for retributive punishment, whenever possible, methods of
offender rehabilitation and rehabilitative restitution.""22 Justice Roaf in a
dissent criticized the Arkansas Supreme Court for woefully failing to consider
a significant portion of the stated purposes of the Juvenile Code.229 She
explained:
We have neither liberally construed the statute to the benefit of the
emotional mental, and physical welfare of the juveniles, nor even for the
best interests of the state. We have failed to insure that methods of
rehabilitation and restitution are substituted wherever possible, for
retributive punishment, and we have surely failed to provide that juveniles
are assured fair hearings and that their constitutional and other rights
provided by this statute are uniformly recognized and enforced. We share
responsibility equally with our elected state representatives.23
227. Id. at 422-23, 932 S.W.2d at 319.
228. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-302(3) (Michie 1993).
229. See Butler, 324 Ark. at 486, 922 S.W.2d at 691 (Roaf, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 487, 922 S.W.2d at 691-92 (Roaf, J., dissenting).
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2. Place the Burden on the State to Establish that A Child Should Be
Tried As An Adult
The dissent in Walker v. State"' should be adopted by the majority. The
dissent was correct in its assertion that the intent of the legislature was for the
burden to be on the State to prove that a child should be prosecuted as an adult
and that there needs to be more than a charging document presented.232 These
rules are mandated by a clear reading of the statute as well as the purposes
mandate of the Arkansas Juvenile Code.
3. Recognize That Violence Committed By A Codefendant Should Not
Always Weigh Against the Child
Children who don't commit violence should be able to be sent to juvenile
court even if their accomplice commits violence. There will be cases in which
a child's participation in a violent crime will weigh against him or her even if
he or she didn't commit violence.233 Yet the statutory language is clear that the
court is supposed to consider whether "violence was employed by the
juvenile. 234 The statute does not say "whether it was a crime of violence."
4. Mandate Meaningful Hearings
The court should reverse its holdings that interpret a charging document
as evidence sufficient to support a finding that a child should be tried as an
adult. The state should have to provide testimonial evidence that proves the
child before the court deserves to be tried as an adult because of his conduct in
the present case or his or her individual history.235
231. 304 Ark. 393, 401-02A, 803 S.W.2d 502, 503-08.
232. See id. at 401-02A, 803 S.W.2d at 507-08.
233. See, e.g., Carroll, 326 Ark. 882, 934 S.W.2d 523 (defendant carried a gun into a
home; while his codefendant killed three children, the defendant wrestled with the mother of
the children). But see Butler, 324 Ark. 476, 922 S.W.2d 685 (no evidence that the defendant
used violence); Guy, 323 Ark. 649, 916 S.W.2d 760 (defendant did not use violence but his
codefendant did); Bell, 317 Ark. 289, 877 S.W.2d 579; Walter, 317 Ark. 274, 878 S.W.2d 374.
234. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(e)(1) (Michie 1995).
235. Following the writing of this article but shortly before it was printed, the Arkansas
Supreme Court concluded that "there must be some evidence to substantiate the serious and
violent nature of the charges contained in the information." Thompson v. State, No. 97-339,
slip op. at 6 (Dec. 11, 1997). Justice Newbern states well the rule that should be adopted in
Hamilton v. State:
No doubt some people below the age of 18 are tough, hardened, and incorrigible.
In my view, the transfer provisions should be interpreted so that such persons wind
up being treated as adults. The State, however, in a case such as this one, should be
1997]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
5. Provide Meaningful Review
The court should mandate that trial judges make specific findings of facts
in these cases.236 Without such findings, the appellate court should reverse the
case for specific findings.
237
Furthermore, the court should recognize its role in providing meaningful
review and not grant deference to the trial judges in such a critically important
stage of the proceeding. 238 The presumption should be as stated in the statute
that children should be tried as children. The trial judges should provide
specific and significant justifications for their clear and convincing findings
that children should be tried as adults.
2 39
B. Use Other Parts of the Code to Strengthen The System
1. Require Predisposition Studies Before the Hearings
Without any major changes in the code or the court's precedent, the
attorneys and trial judges could improve the quality of these decisions by
requesting predisposition reports on all children facing potential adult
charges. 240 These reports are akin to psycho-social reports provided by licensed
required to show more than that a youngster who was aged 14 has been charged
with committing one act of violence.
320 Ark. 346, 896 S.W.2d 877 (1995).
236. Other states have mandated such findings without clear statutory mandates. See T.J.H.
v. Bills, 504 S.W.2d 76 (Mo. 1974); Hubbs v. Commonwealth, 511 S.W.2d 664 (Ky. 1974);
Commonwealth v. Deppeller, 460 A.2d 1184, 1186-1187 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); In re
Stevenson, 538 P.2d 5, 10 (Mont. 1975).
237. If the Arkansas Supreme Court is unwilling to mandate such findings, the legislature
should mandate it. Such findings are mandated in several other states' transfer statutes. See,
e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-34(0 (Michie Supp. 1996); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(d) (West
1996); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 33, § 5506(0 (1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. §260.125(5) (West Supp.
1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-157(6)(d) (Supp. 1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.071(7)(4)
(West 1996).
238. This deference was raised to an unbelievable level in a recent opinion. In Smith, the
trial court's oral basis for the its decision was that the numbers of burglaries charged, the
amount stolen, the failure to help officers retrieve the stolen material, and the lack of parental
guidance. See Smith, 1997 WL 316720. The number of burglaries could make the offense
serious under ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(e)(l), but it is difficult to see how the other items
satisfy a clear and convincing standard that the child should be tried as an adult. However, the
Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that the trial court considered all the statutory factors.
239. The supreme court should review trial court decisions on transfer by the standard
articulated in Pennington, which is whether or not there was a careful, case-by-case evaluation
of the request to transfer a child. See Pennington, 305 Ark. at 315, 807 S.W.2d 662.
240. Such reports are mandated in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-34(e)
(Michie Supp. 1996); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(a) (West Supp. 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 39.059(7)(a) (West Supp. 1997); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 211.071(6) (West 1996).
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social-workers."4 Such reports would go beyond the psychological testing that
has been traditionally presented in transfer cases.242 These reports would
provide valuable information for the issues at these proceedings such as what
environmental or family related factors may have led this child to this conduct
and which if any of these factors could help in rehabilitation.
2. Use Blended Sentencing
For those children who are tried in adult court, the circuit judges should
use the code provision that allows for suspended imposition adult incarceration
and use of the delinquency rehabilitation system.243 Other states have used
these systems well.
The Arkansas Code states:
(a) All youthful male offenders under the age of eighteen (18) years
convicted of a felony in the State of Arkansas may, in the discretion of the
sentencing authority, be sentenced to the appropriate division of the
Department of Human Services or to the Tucker Unit of the Department of
Correction.
(b)(1) If the sentencing authority determines that a youthful male offender
would be more amenable to the rehabilitation programs of the appropriate
division of the Department of Human Services, the sentencing authority
may sentence the youthful offender to the Department of Correction for a
term of years, suspend the sentence, and commit the youth to the custody
of the appropriate division of the Department of Human Services.
(2) In such case, if the youth completes the training school program
satisfactorily, the appropriate division of the Department of Human
241. A predisposition report is defined as:
a report concerning the juvenile, the family of the juvenile, all possible
disposition alternatives, the location of the school in which the juvenile is or
was last enrolled, whether the juvenile has been tested for or has been found
to have any handicap, the name of the juvenile's attorney, and if appointed by
the court, the date of the appointment, any participation by the juvenile or his
family in counseling services previously or currently being provided in
conjunction with adjudication of the juvenile and any other matters relevant
to the efforts to provide treatment to the juvenile or the need for treatment of
the juvenile or the family. The predisposition report shall include a home
study of any out-of-home placement which may be part of a disposition.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-303(28) (Michie Supp. 1995).
242. See supra part V.A.2.iii.
243. Although Arkansas has this system, Ruth Whitney, Director of the Division of Youth
Services is unaware of any child being sent to the Division of Youth Services by a circuit court
judge. Telephone Interview with Ruth Whitney, Director of the Division of Youth Services in
Little Rock, Ark. (June 11, 1997).
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Services shall return him to the sentencing court and provide the court with
a written report of the youth's progress and a recommendation that he be
placed on probation.
(3) In the event that the youth becomes unruly, incorrigible, or is not
amenable to the training program of the appropriate division of the
Department of Human Services, the board may return him to the sentenc-
ing court with a written report of the youth's conduct and a recommenda-
tion that he be transferred to the Department of Correction. The court shall
then revoke the suspension of the sentence originally imposed and commit
the youth to the Tucker Unit of the Department of Correction.2"
This statute allows the juvenile justice system to try to rehabilitate all
children yet provides long term incarceration as a deterrent. The trial judges
are not bound to abide by any recommendations of the Department of Human
Services. If the rehabilitation appears to have been unsuccessful to the judge,
the judge can order the child to the Department of Corrections. Arkansas is
missing an opportunity by its failure to use this statute.
C. Improve the Division of Youth Services' Ability to Handle These Kids
The Division of Youth Services does not have adequate resources to
handle the most difficult children charged with the more serious offenses. The
state should choose to spend money for intensive rehabilitation for a few years
rather than the option of warehousing these children for many years at the
Department of Corrections. In particular, the Division of Youth Services
should develop sufficient facilities to work with persons aged eighteen to
twenty-one years old.245
244. ARK. CODE ANN.§ 12-28-403 (Michie 1995). There are some changes that could
improve this code provision such as expansion of this authority to female offenders and
offenders over eighteen but under twenty-one. However, this provision is still valid and is
strengthened by ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-28-206 (Michie Supp. 1995).
245. In order for a judge to commit a person over the age of eighteen, the Department of
Human Services must determine that there are adequate facilities for such youths. See ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-28-208(d) (Michie Supp. 1995).
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D. Statutory Response: Mandate that All Cases Involving Children Begin
in Juvenile Court'46
The Juvenile Code should be modified to require that all offenses
involving children under the age of eighteen begin in juvenile court. 247  This
process has been adopted by the majority of the states.
After the initial charging decision, the prosecutor would retain his or her
discretion to move to transfer the child to adult court. Prosecutors would not
be losing their discretion,248 but they would clearly have the burden to prove
the need to try the child as an adult. This would also protect the child from
public scrutiny if he or she was not going to be tried as an adult. This change
would also assure that the judges best able to make the decision on transfer
would be given that responsibility. Juvenile judges know the children regularly
brought before juvenile court and are able to compare with other children when
deciding which of the children charged with delinquency should be in adult
246. I am not the first Arkansan to recommend this. See ARKANSAS COMM'N ON JUV. JUST.,
JUVENILE COURTS IN ARKANSAS 30 (1989); Boyce, supra note 55, at 1008-09. The Supreme
Court also recognized that juvenile courts have "the facilities, personnel and expertise for a
proper determination of the waiver issue." Kent, 383 U.S. at 564 (quoting Black v. United
States, 355 F.2d 104, 107 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
247. This could be accomplished with the following revisions to ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-
318:
(a) Juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction when a delinquency case involves a
juvenile. Upon a motion of the court or of any party, the juvenile judge shall
conduct a hearing to determine whether to retain jurisdiction over the matter or to
transfer the case to a circuit court for the case to proceed as a criminal prosecution.
The juvenile court may consider such a motion only when a case involves a
juvenile:
(1) At least sixteen (16) years old when he engages in conduct that, if committed by
an adult, would be any felony;
(2) Fourteen (14) or fifteen (15) years old when he engages in conduct that, if
committed by an adult, would be: [insert the list of enumerated offenses presently
listed in ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(b)(2)-(4) (Michie Supp. 1995)].
(b) In making the decision to retain jurisdiction or to transfer the case, the court shall
consider the following factors: [insert the list of factors presently mandated under
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(e)(l)-(3) (Michie Supp. 1995)].
(C) Upon a finding by clear and convincing evidence that a juvenile should be tried
as an adult, the court shall enter an order to that effect.
(d) If the case is transferred to another court, any bail or appearance bond given for
the appearance of the juvenile shall continue in effect in the court to which the case
is transferred.
(e) Any party may appeal from an order granting or denying the transfer of a case
from one court to another court having jurisdiction over the matter.
248. Filing all charges in juvenile court would also avoid the problem of splitting nine
enumerated offenses in juvenile court and adult court.
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court. 24 9  The juvenile judges also know what delinquency services are
available for children closest to their eighteenth birthday.250
VII. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Arkansas should make it clear through statutes and case law that it wants
to try to save every child brought to the attention of the juvenile courts. The
presumption should be that all children will benefit from going through the
juvenile court system. Only upon a clear showing that the child cannot benefit
from juvenile court should he or she be sent to the adult corrections system.
This system makes sense from a criminal justice, corrections and monetary
basis. Our juvenile court system has succeeded with some children and could
succeed with even more if given the chance. The response to juvenile violent
crimes and the failure of the system in some cases should be to re-evaluate our
system. We should not give up on the children. If our response does not meet
the needs of the children, we should try some other responses.
251
There are commonly accepted causes to delinquency." These causes lead
to logical responses such as a continuum of care that strengthens children's
families, communities, and schools giving individual children support and
hope.2 53 If the state would spend more resources in these areas and less on the
249. See Boyce, supra note 55, at 1008-09.
250. This would eliminate the confusion some judges appear to have over the available
services to children, see supra note 214, and it would minimize the need for expert testimony
on this issue because these judges already have this knowledge of the system. See supra note
148.
251. See D'Ambra, supra note 3, at 5.
We are not sufficiently sophisticated in our diagnostic tools to predict which intervention
will work with which child or family. Thus, we may fail in some initial efforts. Limited failure
should be assumed and accepted.
252. A report published in 1995 from the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Juvenile
Justice summarized thirty years of research by categorizing the following risk factors broken
into four major categories as follows : (I) community-related risk factors including availability
of drugs; availability of firearms; community laws and norms favorable toward drug use,
firearms, and crime; media portrayals of violence; transitions and mobility; low neighborhood
attachment and community disorganization; extreme economic deprivation; (2) family-related
risk factors of family history of problem behavior, family management problems, family
conflict, and favorable parental attitudes concerning crime and involvement in crime; (3)
school-related risk factors of early and persistent antisocial behavior, academic failure in
elementary school, and lack of commitment to school; and, (4) individual and peer-related risk
factors of alienation and rebelliousness, friends who engage in problem behavior, favorable
attitudes toward problem behavior, early initiation of problem behavior, and constitutional
factors. See OFFICE OF JUv. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION WORKS at 6-7 (1995).
253. See OFFICE OF JUv. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION WORKS (1995).
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prosecution of children as adults and incarceration of children in adult facilities,
we may succeed in helping some children.
The popular quick-fix response of locking up the kids has long term
affects.5 4 With this response, we are missing the opportunity to help our
children.
254. Opponents to the juvenile justice system argue that rehabilitation does not work and
deterrence is a better response. They suggest that there are greater costs to society with the
crimes committed by these "predators" left in the juvenile justice system. Although I disagree
with these statements and have not been shown data to support them, I believe we should try
to save the children even if the finances do not work out evenly. The value of a child's future
is more than his or her costs to society. If we save one child, his or her productivity in creative
contributions to society may be greater than our wildest imagination. I accept the proposition
that many children charged with delinquent acts may be a continual drain on our criminal
justice system for years to come. The problem is that we don't know which child will be a drain
and which will be a contributor. I encourage us to foster a hope of contribution and reject the
presumption of drainage.
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